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INTRODUCTION

Overview

Consider the plight of Joe Sinking.' Mr. Sinking is a CEO who was
recently involved in a major corporate decision regarding the construction
of a new nuclear power plant. 2 At the time the decision was announced,
construction was expected to take four years at a cost of about $70 million. Before public hearings were held on the proposed project, the initial
plan was scrapped in favor of a new plan, with projected costs of over
$250 million. By the time the construction permit was granted, more than
$80 million had been spent on preparations and obtaining approval for
the plant. Now, after seven years and a series of mishaps, protests by environmental groups, regulatory changes and costs totalling over $2.5 billion, Mr. Sinking must decide whether to continue the project or scrap it
altogether. Should he continue the project? What role, if any, should the
money and effort already spent play in his decision? Should it matter to
Mr. Sinking that the plant is 70% complete? 90% complete?
Now suppose that our protagonist, Mr. Joe Sinking, has been appointed to the highest court of his jurisdiction and that Justice Sinking
has to resolve a dispute concerning the interpretation of a 60-year-old
statute. The petitioner argues that the present dispute is controlled by a
case decided in that court about 20 years after the statute was enacted.
The respondent argues that because circumstances have changed since the
court decided the controlling precedent-and certainly since the statute
was enacted-Justice Sinking should feel free to disregard the prior case
and decide the dispute in the respondent's favor. Should Justice Sinking
follow the 40-year old precedent? What role, if any, should the prior decision play in his decision?
1. Joe Sinking is a fictional character. The significance of his name will become obvious in
the next few pages.
2. The following hypothetical is based on Jerry Ross & Barry M. Staw, OrganizationalEscalation and Exit: Lessons from the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, 36 ACAD. Moarr. J. 701 (1993)
(examining the Long Island Lighting Company's decision to build and operate the Shoreham Nuclear
Power Plant) [hereinafter Ross & Staw, Lessons from Shoreham].
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This Article argues that, although occurring in two very different
contexts, the two situations involving Mr. Sinking regard essentially the
same decision-making phenomenon. Mr. Sinking's choices possess the
characteristics of what has been referred to in the academic literature as
the escalation of commitment problem. 3 Escalation of commitment refers
to the tendency of individuals to consider "sunk" costs in their calculations.4 A common yet telling example involves the decision by a car
owner to pay additional money to fix her car simply because she has invested so much already in prior repairs.
This Article explores the concept of stare decisis from the escalation
of commitment perspective. I argue that the theory of escalation of commitment provides a powerful tool that can be used in our understanding
of the application of stare decisis. The literature on the use of precedent
is extensive;5 however, this Article develops a new way of looking at
case law development and stare decisis. In particular, the Article contemplates stare decisis as a decision-making process and then considers the
academic literature in order that we may gain some insight into that
process.
The thesis begins to develop in the first part of the Article, wherein
Parts II through IV argue that the process of case law development, with
reliance on stare decisis, can be described as an escalation of commitment situation. First, Part II introduces the escalation of commitment
literature. Then, Part 1m discusses the application of stare decisis. Finally,
Part IV analyzes the process of case law development and the application
of stare decisis from the escalation of commitment perspective. In summary, these sections demonstrate that there is much in common between
stare decisis and the prototypical escalation situation.
3. See Joel Brockner, The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Toward
Theoretical Progress, 17 AcAD. MGMr. REv. 39, 39-42 (1992) (describing the defining features of escalating commitment situations); Donald E. Conlon & Howard Garland, The Role of Project Completion Information in Resource Allocation Decisions, 36 ACAD. MGrr. J. 402 (1993) (analyzing the various determinants of escalation situations); Jerry Ross & Barry M. Staw, Expo 86: An Escalation
Prototype, 31 ADmiN. ScL Q. 274, 275-79 (1986) [hereinafter Ross & Staw, Expo 86] (discussing
four general classes of determinants of escalation); Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A
Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action, 16 ORGANIZATONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
PERFORANCE 27, 29 (1976) (describing U.S. involvement in Indochina during the Vietnam conflict
from the perspective of the theory of escalation of commitment); Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross,
Knowing Vhen to Pull the Plug, 1987 HARv. Bus. REv. 68, 68-71 [hereinafter Staw & Ross, Knowing] (describing the escalation of commitment process).
4. See discussion infra Part ll.A.
5.

See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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The thesis continues to develop in the second part of the Article,
wherein Parts V through VII turn to the analysis of the normative implications of the escalation of commitment theory. Academic literature has
traditionally described escalation of commitment as a "flaw," or a decision-making "quirk." ' 6 Can the same be said of escalation of commitment
in the context of judicial decision-making? Part V discusses the normative implications of viewing stare decisis as an escalation of commitment
problem. I contend that most of the rationales advanced in favor of stare
decisis are consistent with the argument that judicial decision-making and
stare decisis involve escalation of commitment. However, I argue that
there is at least one aspect of the judicial decision making process-the
unique role that judges play in legitimizing the judical process-which is
not accounted for in the escalation literature. Thus, I conclude, this idiosyncratic role played by judges as decision makers provides a strong reason for a continued use of the doctrine of stare decisis, albeit in a modified form. The question then becomes: What is the appropriate use of
precedent?
Before answering this question, I turn one more time to the decision-making literature to explore possible solutions to the escalation
problem. In Part VI, I discuss the process of "de-escalation" of commitment, and its application to the judicial decision-making process. I use
this discussion to establish a benchmark against which we can judge the
approach currently followed by the Supreme Court regarding stare
decisis.
In Part VII I focus on the doctrinal application of the escalation
framework. Two major doctrinal issues are analyzed. First, I elaborate on
the implications of the escalation framework for the distinction courts
have traditionally made concerning the doctrine of stare decisis. In particular I argue that the escalation framework suggests that the distinction
between constitutional and statutory stare decisis is unwarranted and that,
instead, a weaker form of precedent should be applied to all types of
cases. Second, Part VII uses the escalation framework as a benchmark
against which I evaluate the recent model of stare decisis developed over
the last decade by the Rehnquist Court, and a more recent model of stare
decisis advanced by Professor William Eskridge. Part VIII concludes the
paper.
6. See Chandra Kanodia et aL., Escalation Errors and the Sunk Cost Effect: An Explanation
Based on Reputation and Infonnation Assymmetries, 27 J. Accr. Ras. 59, 60 (1989) (arguing that
"escalation behavior can be explained as part of a larger phenomenon of hiding private information

on human capital").
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Caveats and Limitations

A couple of general explanatory notes are in order. First, any discussion about stare decisis faces an initial problem: while stare decisis has
been described as central to our system of law, 7 it has also faced an extraordinary amount of skepticism. This criticism is somewhat well deserved as judges have, at times, conveniently used the doctrine in an unprincipled manner.8 In this Article, I operate from the assumption that the
doctrine matters and that the problematic issue is not whether to follow
precedent at all but when to do so. Accordingly, I try to develop a
framework to help us understand the proper role of precedent in the judicial decision-making process.
Second, I discuss the doctrine of stare decisis at a fairly abstract
level; that is, I consider the doctrine as applicable to judicial decisionmaking in general. Obviously, due to the hierarchical nature of the judicial system in the United States, lower courts experience stare decisis
differently than higher courts. Where appropriate, I have made such a
distinction.
Finally, I focus this Article on horizontal stare decisis (the following
of precedents over time) as opposed to vertical stare decisis (dealing with
the hierarchical relationship between lower and higher courts). While the
two forms of stare decisis share some features, and indeed some of the
arguments made in this Article can be applied indistinguishably, there are
various important idiosyncracies. Where appropriate, I make reference to
those distinctions.
7. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
8. Compare Justice Scalia's statement in Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), superseded by 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(Supp. II 1996) "Who ignores [the doctrine of stare decisis] must give reasons, and reasons that go
beyond mere demonstration that the overruled opinion was wrong (otherwise the doctrine would be
no doctrine at all)"-with his statement in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834-35 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring)-"[The doctrine of stare decisis], to the extent it rests upon anything more than administrative convenience, is merely the application to judicial precedents of a more general principle
that the settled practices and expectations of a democratic society should generally not be disturbed
by the courts." While the two statements are not necessarily contradictory, they convey a different
tone with regard to the manner in which the courts should apply stare decisis. See Amy L. Padden,
Note, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a Decision's Vote, Age, and Subject
Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Tennessee, 82 GEo. L. 1689, 1706 (1994)
(criticizing Justice Scalia for attacking the doctrine of stare decisis only "when it dictates a different
result from that which he would have reached himself"); see also Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis:
Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNEtL L. REv. 401, 402 (1988)
("[S]tare decisis has always been a doctrine of convenience, to both conservatives and liberals.").
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II.

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ESCALATION OF COMMITMENT THEORY

A.

Escalation of Commitment and Sunk Costs

Decision-making research has broadly classified decisions as either
one-time or sequential. 9 Sequential decisions involve: (1) an initial allocation of resources with the expectation of achieving a given goal;' 0 (2) a
feedback phase, in which decision-makers receive information signaling
either that they are engaged in a failing venture or that they have not yet
attained their goals;" (3) some level of uncertainty;' 2 and (4) a follow-up
decision regarding whether to continue or withdraw from the initial
course of action. 1' One particularly crucial element of some sequential
decisions is that of sunk costs.
Sunk costs refer to costs that have already been incurred and that
14
are beyond recovery at the point when the follow-up decision is made;
that is, sunk costs may be conceptualized as a payment that was made in
response to an earlier decision. The payment may have been in the form
of money, but also may have been in the form of time or effort. 15 Sunk
costs occur when, over time, streams of anticipated costs and revenues
are involved in multiple decisions or multiple time periods. 16 If the reali9. See JOEL BROCKNER & JEFFREY Z. RuBIN, ENTRAPmENT INESCALATING CONFLICrS: A SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALysTs 4 (1985). One-time decisions, by definition, cannot result in escalation of
commitment situations, since all the effects of the decision are realized immediately. Without future
flows of revenues and costs there are no sunk costs, and thus no possibility for escalation. See Gregory B. Northeraft & Gerrit Wolf, Dollars, Sense, and Sunk Costs: A Life Cycle Model of Resource
Allocation Decisions, 9 ACAD. MGNar. REv. 225, 226 (1984).
10. See Brockner, supra note 3, at 39-40.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. In an environment where choice is not possible, escalation would not exist. The
possibility of choice is the key to the processes that operate to create escalating behavior. Thus, for
example, an individual who continues to put money into a car that continues to break down frequently, but who does not have resources to replace the car, is not engaged in escalation type behavior. See BROCKNER & RuBIN, supra note 9, at 246-48 (discussing the conflict between the United
States and El Salvador in the mid-1980s from the escalation of commitment perspective).
14. See ROBERT H. FRANK, M1CROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 11-14, 231-32 (Scott D. Stratford
& Curt Berkowitz eds., 1991) (discussing the sunk costs effect as a pitfall to rational decision making); Barry M. Staw & Ha Hoang, Sunk Costs in the NBA: Why Draft Order Affects Playing 7Time
and Survival in ProfessionalBasketball, 40 Annw. Sm. Q. 474, 474-77 (1995) (analyzing the escalation problem within the context of the National Basketball Association draft).
15. See Howard Garland & Stephanie Newport, Effects of Absolute and Relative Sunk Costs
on the Decision to Persist with a Course of Action, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION
PRocssrs 55, 55 (1991) (showing that relative rather than absolute magnitude sunk costs have a significant impact on subjects' reported likelihood of escalation of commitment).
16. See Gregory B. Northcraft & Gerrit Wolf, Dollars, Sense, and Sunk Costs: A Life Cycle
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zation of costs and revenues occurs at a single decision point, the decision-maker incurs no sunk costs.
With decisions involving sunk costs, decision-makers commonly attempt to recover those costs by persisting in the course of action they
previously chose. Escalation of commitment refers to the tendency for
decision-makers to increase their commitment to previously chosen behaviors on the expectation of recovering the costs already incurred. 17 Despite receiving feedback indicating the wrongheaded character of their
prior choices, decision-makers become locked into losing situations, be18
having as if they were "throwing good money after bad."
Escalation situations occur both at the individual and organization
levels. Examples of escalation at the individual level include: the decision to wait for a bus for a period of time substantially longer than that
which it would have taken to walk to the destination;1 9 the decision to
put additional money into fixing a broken car; 20 and the decision to
change jobs. 2' At the organization level, examples of escalation include
decisions regarding whether to end labor strikes and whether to terminate
ineffective employees. 22 War efforts can also be characterized as escalation situations. For example, a national government engaged in a war involving a considerable loss of life, money, and reputation, must decide
whether to make further economic allocations to the war effort. 3 Thus,
escalation is created by the tendency to consider sunk costs, costs that
are beyond recovery, in choices about future behavior.24
Sequential decisions involving sunk costs, therefore, raise a particularly acute dilemma for decision-makers. What role, if any, should be
given to the initial decision? Should the costs incurred in making and implementing the initial decision be considered in deciding whether to conModel of Resource Allocation Decisions, 9 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 225, 225 (1984) (examining the "relevance of negative feedback to the decision to commit further resources to completion of a
project").
17. See Brockner, supra note 3, at 40-41.
18. Ross & Staw, Lessons from Shoreham, supra note 2, at 702.
19. See BROCKNER & RUBIN, supra note 9, at 1-2.
20. See id. at 2.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 2-3.
23. See id. at 245-48.
24. A common experimental design involves an unusual auction situation in which the highest
bidder wins a monetary purse but the loser has to pay the amount of his or her bid. This experimental setting creates a situation in which participants continue bidding in order to avoid a certain loss
(the amount of their bid). Researchers have demonstrated that participants are likely to become so
committed to their position that they will pay more for the monetary reward than it is worth. See
Staw & Hoang, supra note 14, at 475-76.
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tinue the previous course of action? In the parlance of decision-making
theory, how much weight should be given to "sunk" costs in future
decisions?
B.

Why Do Individuals Consider Sunk Costs?

A number of factors have been advanced to explain why individuals
tend to consider sunk costs in sequential decisions. In particular, four
factors have been identified as affecting behavior in escalation situations:
characteristics of the decision, and psychological, social and structural
determinants. None of these factors are completely determinative of escalation and, as will be apparent shortly, their effect may vary at different
points during an escalation of commitment experience.
1.

Characteristicsof the Decision

Many believe that the sunk costs problem is caused, in part, by the
substantive aspects of the choice itself. For example, factors such as the
expected value of the outcome of a particular decision,25 the risks associated with the decision, 26 and the costs associated with changing the
course of prior decisions 27 are likely to affect an individual's decisionmaking process. Whether these lead to escalation depends on the clarity
of the available information.28 To the extent that there is clear and salient
information to explain the negative results of an allocation of resources,
it is less likely that individuals will consider sunk costs in making their
decisions. 29 Conditions of uncertainty, on the other hand, are likely to result in escalation. 30 For example, an individual's assessment of whether a
25. See id.
26. For example, in their analysis of the Shoreham Nuclear Plant project, Professors Ross and
Staw point out that the salvage value of the nuclear plant was never high as compared to it costs,
and that following the initial testing of the plant, the salvage value was zero. See Ross & Staw, Lessons from Shoreham, supra note 2, at 716.
27. For example, a business manager will be more likely to stop a failing advertising campaign than the construction of a half-completed plant whose costs have substantially exceeded its
budget. The manager will be more likely to consider the sunk costs of the plant project than those of
the advertising campaign because of the costs associated with the decision to terminate the project.
Notice that the argument is not that such closing costs should not be considered in making a decision; they indeed should be taken into account. The point is that the presence of large closing costs
is likely to aggravate the escalation problem. See id.
28. See Edward J. Conlon & Judi McLean Parks, Infonnation Requests in the Context of Escalation, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 344, 345 (1987) (discussing the relevance of clarity of information to
escalation situations).
29. See id.
30. See Ross & Staw, Lessons from Shoreham, supra note 2, at 715.

HeinOnline -- 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 97 1998-1999

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:89

negative outcome is deemed to be due to a temporary or random setback,
or to a permanent causal factor, will influence that person's decision.31
Therefore, the type of information provided to the decision-maker can increase the tendency to escalate.
Another characteristic of the decision that is likely to influence the
decision-maker's choice is whether an "active" or "passive" decision is
required. 32 In passive situations, commitment to a previously chosen
course of action will continue unless the individual deliberately decides
to change course.33 On the other hand, in active situations, continuing involvement requires the affirmative commitment of resources. 34 Escalation
of commitment is expected to be more common in cases involving passive as opposed to active decisions. 35 Arguably, it is both physically and
psychologically easier for the decision-maker to escalate in the case of
passive decisions since no action need be taken to increase prior commitments.3 6 Not only is it easier to escalate in the passive decision situation,
but also it is true that requiring the decision-maker to take affirmative action is likely to make more salient the various aspects of the decision, 37
31. Consider, for example, the situation of a manager having to decide whether to maintain or
discontinue a recently introduced product line after having received a negative marketing report on
the product's sales. Whether the manager decides to continue to spend additional resources on the
product is likely to be affected by whether he believes the problems to be related to temporary
causes, such as unusually bad weather, or to permanent causes, such as technological changes that
have made the product obsolete. See Staw & Ross, Knowing, supra note 3, at 69.
32. See BROCiKNER & RuBiN, supra note 9, at 42-43.
33. See icL Typical examples include waiting for a bus or maintaining an unsatisfactory relationship or employment.
34. See id. Decisions such as further investment in a business venture or construction project
are obvious examples.
35. See id. at 43. The passive/active variable has been manipulated in various experimental
settings. One such experiment involves the use of the "counter game." In the counter game individuals are provided with a initial amount of money and are told that the money is theirs to keep and
that they can leave the experiment at any time. The game involves placing the individuals in front of
an electronic terminal. Individuals are told that the numbers they will observe will increase at a
given rate per unit of time. The subjects are told that a winning number has been randomly selected,
such that when the number appears in the screen an alarm will sound indicating that the subject has
won the game prize. The prize is smaller than the initial amount. The subjects have to pay for each
additional try. In the passive situation, subjects are told the following: "If you want to go on for the
jackpot, do not say anything. If you want to quit, announce out loud the word STOP. Unless you say
STOP, the experimenter will re-start the [terminal]..... In the active decision, on the other hand,
subjects are told that "If you want to go on for the jackpot, you must announce out loud the words
GO ON. Unless you say GO ON, the experimenter will not re-start the [terminal], and you will be
forced to quit at that point." The results of the experiment show that those in the passive situation
invest more money than those in the active situation. Id. at 43-46.
36. See id. at 50.
37. See id.
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thereby reducing the likelihood of escalating-type behavior.
2.

Psychological Determinants

In addition to factors associated with the substantive aspects of the
decision, factors associated with the manner in which individuals make
decisions are likely to influence a decision-maker's tendency to escalate.
The focus here is not to provide an analysis of the decision-maker's
psyche but to describe the structural factors that are likely to influence
the manner in which a decision is made.
"Self-justification" is one of the key psychological factors affecting
the behavior of individuals in escalating situations. Self-justification refers to the tendency of individuals to escalate their commitment to prior
courses of action because of their unwillingness to admit to themselves,
or to others, that earlier decisions were misguided.3 8 Thus, escalation is
often caused by the unwillingness of the decision-maker to admit that
prior expenditures were in vain. Accordingly, as the investment made by
the decision-maker increases, so too does the unwillingness to admit failure and, thus, the greater the likelihood of escalating behavior. It is important then to identify the factors likely to affect an individual's unwillingness to admit failure after having been confronted with negative
feedback.3 9
The unwillingness to admit failure is directly related to a high need
to justify the correctness of the initial allocation of resources. 40 Thus, individuals are expected to be more likely to escalate when they are personally responsible for the chosen course of action.41 The need to justify
the correctness of prior decisions is affected by the consequences of admitting failure. For example, research has shown that the extent to which
the decision-maker's job security is dependent on the "correctness" of
42
the decision is positively associated with the likelihood of escalation.
38. See generally F. David Schoorman, Escalation Bias in PerformanceAppraisals: An Unintended Consequence of Supervisor Participationin Hiring Decisions, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 58
(1988) (finding that supervisors involved in hiring decisions are more likely to subsequently bias
performance appraisal ratings for the hired employee even when confronted with performance data
that suggests a different conclusion).
39. See BRocKNER & RumN, supra note 9, at 101.
40. This phenomenon has also been described as "face saving." Social behavior, it is argued,
is motivated by the desire to "look good" and to present oneself favorably before others. See id.
41. See generally Staw, supra note 3.
42. See BROCKNER & RuBi, supra note 9, at 111-12. As the text indicates, decision-making
research has focused primarily on the negative consequences of a wrong decision on the job security
of the decision maker. An interesting, although not yet explored question will be whether in situations where there is little relationship between the outcome of the decision and the individual's level
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The need to justify is also related to the extent of controversy surrounding the initial allocation of resources. If the initial decision was made in
the face of substantial resistance by other individuals within the organization, the decision-maker will likely feel a greater need to justify their
prior decision and, therefore, to engage in escalating-type behavior.43
The tendency of individuals to escalate is also associated with the
way they process information. In particular, prospect theory4 focuses on
the way in which decision-makers process information under conditions
of uncertainty and describes decision-making rules under those circumstances. 45 The theory puts forth two observations. First, prospect theory
postulates that people evaluate choices in terms of gains or losses relative
to a reference point 46 and that "losses loom larger than the corresponding
gains." 47 Second, prospect theory proposes that decision-makers are influenced by a "certainty effect."' 48 This refers to the fact that individuals
tend to "overweight" outcomes that are certain as compared to those that
are merely probable. 49 These two observations help define a "value function" that captures the manner in which individuals make decisions. 50
of job security, escalation is also likely to occur. For example, in cases in which the individual's job
security is completely unrelated to performance, the individual might ignore important information
that would alert her to the possibility of escalation.
43. See Frederick V. Fox & Barry M. Staw, The Trapped Administrator: Effects of Job Insecurity and Policy Resistance upon Commitment to a Course of Action, 24 ADmN. ScL Q. 449, 464-65
(1979).
44. There is impressive and fast growing legal scholarship on the application of prospect theory to legal issues. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under InformationalAsymmetry: The Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391 (1990); Russell Korobkin, The
Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 608 (1998); Edward J. McCaffery
et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. Rav. 1341
(1995).
45. See Glen Whyte, Escalating Commitment to a Course of Action: A Reinterpretation, 11
ACAD. MG,,rr. REv. 311, 314 (1986).
46. This basically refers to the notion of relative preferences. For a review and application of
relative preferences to legal issues see Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE LJ. 1
(1992). McAdams notes that prospect theory differs from rational economic theory under which
choices are evaluated in terms of changes in total wealth. See id. at 4-5.
47. This is referred to as "loss aversion." Hasen, supra note 44, at 397.
48. See Howard Garland et al., De-Escalation of Commitment in Oil Exploration: When Sunk
Costs and Negative Feedback Coincide, 75 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 721, 721 (1990).
49. See id.
50. The value function is centered at the status quo and defined over deviations from the status quo; it is concave in the domain of gains, convex and steeper in the domain of losses, and
steeper for losses than for gains. See Raymond S. Hartman et al., Consumer Rationality and the Status Quo, QJ. ECON., Feb. 1991, at 141, 142. Rational theory assumes that the decision-maker has a
utility function that is uniformly concave. See id. at 141. This represents the fact that while decisionmakers are risk-averse, they calculate changes in total wealth, as opposed to relative changes in
wealth. The shape of the value function advanced by prospect theory reflects the generalization that
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The major insight provided by the value function is the observation that
individuals exhibit risk-averting behavior in choices involving sure gains
and risk-seeking behavior in choices involving sure losses.5
In the typical escalation situation, the individual, after receiving negative feedback, has the option of withdrawing from a given course of action (i.e., a certain loss) or continuing to commit resources in anticipation
of an uncertain gain. 52 Individuals confronting this choice are likely to
view the situation from the point of reference of a loss.5 Given the likelihood of risk-seeking behavior in the domain of losses, individuals are
likely to escalate rather than withdraw.
Prospect theory has also helped decision-making researchers to identify the so-called "status quo" effect. The status quo effect indicates that
individuals favor preserving a state of affairs that they perceive to be the
status quo rather than switching to an alternate state. 54 The status quo effect follows directly from the observation that losses are weighted substantially more than objectively commensurate gains. 5" Since changing
courses of action in a sequential decision is likely to be evaluated as a
loss, and given the "overweighting" of losses, on average, individuals
are expected to choose the status quo over other options.
3. Social Determinants
Social factors also function into the forces at work among individual
decision-makers. For example, the desire not to lose credibility with
others is likely to cause individuals to persist in a failing course of action.56 Thus, not only are decision-makers subject to the pressure of selfjustification by not wanting to admit to themselves that they were wrong,
but also they are likely to be extremely hesitant to expose their mistake
just as a difference in subjective value between a move in utility from $50 to $150 appears greater
that a change in utility from $1050 to $1150, the difference in subjective value between a loss of
$150 and $50 appears greater than the difference in subjective value between a loss of $1150 and
$1050. See id.; see also Brockner, supra note 3, at 50; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 EcONo.,MarRCA 263, 268-69 (1979).
51. See Brockner, supra note 3, at 50.
52. See id. at 50-51.
53. See id. at 51.
54. See Korobkin, supra note 44, at 625. This effect has also been referred to as the "endowment effect" or the "willingness to pay versus willingness to accept" differential. McCaffery et al.,
supra note 44, at 1351.
55. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL EcON. 1325, 1326 (1990).
56. See Ross & Staw, Expo 86, supra note 3, at 277. Notice that unlike the self-justification
factors, social determinants result from sources exogenous to the individual.
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to others. 57 This kind of pressure is likely to be stronger in contexts
where individuals make their decisions under the gaze of a large
58
audience.
In addition to the kind of social pressure described above, other
forms of social pressure appear to influence escalating behavior. In particular, factors such as the effect of other's perceptions regarding the role
of the decision-maker, and the need for the decision-maker to gain the
approval of others, have been identified as significant determinants of escalation of commitment.5 9 Decision-makers who show consistency rather
than ambivalence tend to experience higher approval ratings. 60 Thus, persistence is seen as a sign of leadership. 61 Accordingly, it is not surprising
that decision-makers refuse to withdraw from losing causes even when
62
facing negative feedback.

4. Structural Detenninants
Decision making creates a set of relationships which become the
structural context for the decision itself. The decision, in a sense, acquires a "life of its own." Changing courses of action becomes much
more difficult since forces outside the reach of any one individual appear
to take control. Three key factors-inertia, political alliances, and institutional identity-explain the effect that these relationships have on the
tendency to escalate. 63 These factors are best explained in the context of
the organization decision-maker.
The more time that has passed since the initial decision was made,
the greater the likelihood that the initial outcome has become internalized
by the organization affected. 64 Once internalized, the decision becomes
part of the life of the organization: embedded into its structures and
processes. 65 Any attempt to rectify or change the initial decision is likely
to be complicated, requiring major disruptions throughout the organiza57. See id.
58. See Joel Brockner et al., Face-saving and Entrapment, 17 J. EXPERImNTAL Soc. PSYCHOL.
68, 77-78 (1981) (describing the effects that the number of monitors have on the tendency of individuals to escalate).
59. See id.
60. See Ross & Staw, Expo 86, supra note 3, at 277.
61. See Staw & Ross, Knowing, supra note 3, at 70.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 70-71.
64. See Ross & Staw, Expo 86, supra note 3, at 277-78.
65. See id
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tion. 66 For example, a manager's decision to drop a previously adopted
product line might involve not only the issue of stopping production, but
also issues such as corporate restructuring, layoffs, and collective bargaining contracts. 67 The interrelationships that are created with the passage of time produce inertia: a tendency to leave things as they are.
Additionally, decisions are not made in a vacuum-particularly not
in a political vacuum. Once a decision is made, political forces can provide independent pressure to continue a failing course of action. 68 Thus,
individuals or groups that were positively affected by the initial decision
are likely to exert pressure on the decision-maker to continue said decision. Again, using the example of a business organization, an initial decision to open a new product line will likely result in the creation of new
positions and departments within the organization, and new contacts
outside the organization (e.g., with suppliers). A decision to terminate the
product line, even if objectively proper, might encounter resistance from
these other groups, whose existence may depend upon the survival of
69
that line.
Finally, a decision can become so much a part of the institutional
identity of the decision-maker that it becomes difficult-even impossible-to withdraw. 70 The decision, in this sense, becomes integrally tied to
the identity of the organization. There have been multiple examples of
business organizations that have refused to discontinue losing projects because the projects have become the core identities of those firms. 7
C. Summary
Escalation of commitment refers to situations in which individuals
increase their commitment to failing courses of action. The escalation
problem is not unique to business organizations but appears to arise in a
multiplicity of settings, at both the individual and group levels, since se66. See id.
67. See Staw & Ross, Knowing, supra note 3, at 71.
68. See id.
69. See Ross & Staw, Expo 86, supra note 3, at 278.
70. See Staw & Ross, Knowing, supra note 3, at 71.
71. Professors Staw and Ross illustrate this point with the example of Pan American World
Airways ("Pan Am"). After having experienced severe financial losses due to airline de-regulation,
Pan Am insisted on maintaining its domestic routes and heavily crowded international markets,
choosing instead to sell most of its other highly profitable assets (e.g., the Pan Am building in New
York and the Intercontinental Hotels Corporation). Professors Staw and Ross suggest that Pan Am
managers probably did not consider selling the airline, since that was the identity of the organization.
See id.
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quential decisions and the tendency to consider sunk costs are common
in all kinds of environments. Four factors have been identified as contributing to the tendency of individuals to consider sunk costs in their decisions: the characteristics of the decision itself; the manner in which decision-makers process information; the existence of social pressure; and the
structural context of the decision. These factors are common-maybe inherent-in the judicial decision-making process. Consequently, it is necessary to think of the judicial decision-making process as subject to the
escalation of commitment problem.
III.

PRECEDENT-AT ITS BEST

Stare decisis is probably the most basic principle of judicial decision-making in the Unites States. 72 As such, it is natural to expect that
anyone seeking to challenge the validity of the use of precedent is subject to an enormous burden of proof.73 An extensive body of literature
exists on the doctrine of stare decisis.74 Those who challenge the doctrine
have raised two distinct arguments. Some critics of stare decisis have
challenged the doctrine's rationales on the grounds that they are flawed. 75
Others have argued that, even assuming that the goals of stare decisis are
worth pursuing, it is not clear that stare decisis is the best way of
76
achieving them.
My approach is different. I will assume that there are valid reasons
to continue to adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis. I do not question
72. See William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 CoLUM. L. REv. 735, 735-37 (1949).
73. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and
Theory, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 68, 69 (1991).
74. See, e.g., Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn't; When Do We Kiss
It and When Do We Kill It?, 17 Pap. L. REv. 605 (1990); Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989); James J. Eisenhower, III, Four Theories of Precedent and Its Role
in Judicial Decisions, 61 T"liaLE L. REv. 871 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory
Precedents, 76 GEO. L. 1361 (1988); David Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent, 38
VAND. L. REv. 495 (1985); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. RFv. 367 (1988); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571 (1987).
75. See Maltz, supra note 74, at 368-72. Critics have argued that none of the justifications advanced in favor of stare decisis are compelling enough to justify the adherence to precedent and that
the goals of equity, efficiency, and consistency can be achieved through less draconian principles.
Opponents also point out that there are costs associated with adherence to precedent. These costs include, for example, diminished flexibility and adaptability as well as inefficient decision-making.
Professor Schauer has noted that "[i]f the best solution to today's case is identical to the best solution for tomorrow's different but assimilable facts, then there is no problem. But if what is best for
today's situation might not be best for a different (but likely to be assimilated) situation, then the
need to consider the future as well as the present will result in at least some immediately suboptimal
decisions." Schauer, supra note 74, at 589.
76. See generally Alexander, supra note 74.
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whether considerations based on fairness, equity, reliance, and efficiency
are worthy goals, or that stare decisis is one way to accomplish those
goals. Rather, my argument is that the justifications in favor of stare decisis are consistent with the factors that have fueled the escalation of
commitment problem.
A.

Basic Definition

One of the most basic principles of common law legal systems in
general, and of the U.S. judicial system in particular, is the concept of
stare decisis.7 7 This principle requires courts to adhere to precedent in deciding cases. 78 Justice Harlan articulated the basic tenets of the doctrine
in a passage that is particularly revealing given the framework proposed
in this Article.
Very weighty considerations underlie the principle that courts should not
lightly overrule past decisions. Among these are the desirability that the law furnish a clear guide for conduct of individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs
with assurance against untoward surprise; the importance of furthering fair and expeditious adjudication by eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case; and the necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as
a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments.79

Under stare decisis, the "precedent case" controls, in all relevant respects, the result in all future cases presenting similar facts.80 In its
strongest form, stare decisis requires the deciding court to follow precedent even though it believes that the precedent was wrongly decided. 81
"Weaker" forms of stare decisis recognize that, in the interest of growth
and change, courts sometimes will deviate from earlier decisions.8 2 In
general, however, the basic argument for stare decisis can be described
as follows: "[t]he previous treatment of occurrence X in manner Y constitutes, solely because of its historicalpedigree, a reason for treating X
in manner Y if and when X again occurs." 3
While discussion about the doctrine of stare decisis is normally
framed in terms of whether to follow or abandon a prior decision, these
77.
78.

See id at 3.
See Richard L. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEo. LU. 2225,

2237 (1997).
79. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
80. See Maltz, supra note 74, at 372.
81. See Alexander, supra note 74, at 3.
82. See Eskridge, supra note 74, at 1361.
83. Schauer, supra note 74, at 571.
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options are certainly not the only ones available to a deciding court.
When faced with a set of facts, a judge can also find that no rule relates
to those facts and, thus, expand the domain of the existing rule so as to
perpetuate its validity 4 The deciding court could, similarly, interpret the
prior rule narrowly so as to require the adoption of a new rule to solve
the existing dispute. In the latter case, the court would have managed to
effectively abandon precedent without doing so directly. For purposes of
this Article, these options are treated as indistinguishable since they all
involve essentially the same ultimate decision: whether to make a judgment solely based on the rules and principles established in a prior case,
or whether to consider the dispute anew.
B.

Rationalesfor Stare Decisis

The adherence to precedent has been justified on various grounds
85
ranging from efficiency and resource allocation to equity and faimess.
Supporters of precedent have argued, for example, that given the limited
resources available to the judiciary, and given that having to reconsider
each case from scratch would place undue burdens on these limited re86
sources, the doctrine of stare decisis promotes judicial efficiency.
Others have argued that the use of precedent ensures that similarly situated litigants will be treated equally over time, thereby allowing individuals to plan their affairs by knowing the future legal consequences of their
actions.87
1. The Efficiency Argument
Every organization operates within the constraints imposed by limited resources. Courts are no exception. Deciding legal disputes is a difficult and time-consuming process.88 Courts, it is argued, do not have the
luxury of considering every issue as a new one each time it is raised. In
Justice Cardozo's words, "the labor of judges would be increased almost
to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every
84. See Lawrence E. Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Dynamics of the Legal Process, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 405, 407 (1982) (providing a dynamic analysis of the judicial decision-making
process).
85. See Maltz, supra note 74, at 668-72; Padden, supra note 8, at 1691-94; Pierce, supra note
78, at 2237-48; James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare
Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REv. 345, 347-64 (1986).
86. See Pierce, supra note 78, at 2237-48.
87. See Maltz, supra note 74, at 368.
88. See Pierce, supra note 78, at 2238.
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case, and one could not only lay one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before
him."' 89 This theory holds that courts following precedent are able to conserve scarce decisional resources which, in turn, frees up time to address
new and challenging cases. 90
Stare decisis increases efficiency in yet another way. Knowing that a
decision made today could have precedential effect in future cases, stare
decisis encourages judges to exercise foresight in deciding present
cases. 91 The principle anticipates that judges will take into account the
future types of cases to which the rule adopted in the current case will
apply, and upon that consideration will more carefully craft their rules.
2. The Equality Argument and its Effect on Institutional Reputation
Stare decisis has also been defended on the grounds that it is necessary to promote equality and fairness. Supporters say that like cases
should produce like results, independent of the time in which the dispute
is litigated. 92 Furthermore, fairness in decision-making is achieved
through rules designed to achieve consistency across a range of decisions. 93 Reliance on precedent is a way of achieving consistency and,
thus, fairness across time.94
An important aspect of the equality argument is the effect that fair
results have on the reputation of the decision-maker. Stare decisis allows
courts to strengthen their reputation by promoting the perception that decisions are consistent over time.95 Thus, not only fairness in fact, but the
appearance of fairness, are advanced as rationales for the use of stare
96

decisis.

89.

BENJA!uN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCES 149 (1921).

90.

See Schauer, supra note 74, at 599.

91. See Pierce, supra note 78, at 2238. Professor Schauer refers to this issue as the "forwardlooking" aspect of precedent. Today's decision can be viewed as a precedent for future decisions.
"Today is not only yesterday's tomorrow; it is also tomorrow's yesterday. A system of precedent
therefore involves the special responsibility accompanying the power to commit the future before we
get there." Schauer, supra note 74, at 573.
92.

See Pierce, supra note 78, at 2243.

93.

See Schauer, supra note 74, at 596.

94.

See id.

95.

See Maltz, supra note 74, at 371.

96.

See Padden, supra note 8, at 1693.
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The Certainty/RelianceArgument

In addition to considerations of efficiency and fairness, the doctrine
of stare decisis has also been justified on the basis of a need for certainty in the law.97 Under this theory, individuals should be able to predict the legal consequences of their behavior and that ability would be
seriously eroded if courts were free to disregard precedent. 98 A similar
rationale is advanced in a reliance argument. 99 As such, a prior decision
serving as precedent is likely to induce reliance on the understanding that
the decision is valid and that it will continue to be followed in the future. t'0 In these cases, overruling precedent can result in extreme hardship to those who have relied on the prior ruling.101
C. Different Types of Stare Decisis
1. Basic Scheme: Statutory, Constitutional, and Common Law
Precedent
The doctrine of stare decisis is particularly interesting because it has
been applied with different force in a number of contexts. In particular,
courts and commentators refer to three types of stare decisis: statutory,
constitutional, and common law. The theory of stare decisis advanced in
this Article sheds some light on the validity of this distinction.
A three-tiered hierarchy of stare decisis has developed over the
years. 02 Statutory stare decisis, which refers to the role of precedent in
10 3
interpreting statutes, involves a heightened adherence to precedent.
Courts should, under this version of stare decisis, overrule statutory precedent only under the most compelling of circumstances.' 4 Stare decisis
is, on the other hand, weakly applied in the context of constitutional precedent. 0 5 The Supreme Court, for instance, has consistently followed the
97. See Maltz, supra note 74, at 368.
98. See id.
99. See Schauer, supra note 74, at 572-75.
100. See id.
101. See id
102. See Eskridge, supra note 74, at 1362.
103. See iL
104. See id.
105.
[l]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is
practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to
the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of
trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.
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proposition that precedents should carry less weight in constitutional
cases than in cases involving statutory interpretation.10 6 Application of
stare decisis in the common law area is somewhere in between the constitutional and statutory areas.10 7 Therefore, common law precedents enjoy a presumption of correctness stronger than that applied to constitutional cases, but not as constraining as that enjoyed by statutory
precedents.
2. Rationale for the Distinction
Various reasons have been advanced for the development of the
three-tiered approach to stare decisis.'0 8 Viewing common law precedent
as the base form of stare decisis, the question then becomes: why should
we raise or lower the base presumption in the case of statutory and constitutional precedent, respectively?
The strong presumption applied to statutory precedent is based on
the proposition that legislative silence amounts to legislative approval and
that judicial interpretation of a statute over time becomes part of the statute itself.10 9 As such, any further judicial reinterpretation of the statute
amounts to a statutory amendment, and thus, a usurpation of the legislature's power."'0 The Supreme Court has advanced this argument in some
fairly notorious cases."'1 Chief Justice Harlan Stone argued, for example,
that Congress' failure to amend a statute to overrule statutory precedent
Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted), overruled by Helvering v. Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
106. See Rehnquist, supra note 85, at 348.
107. See Eskridge, supra note 74, at 1362.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 1366-67. "After a statute has been settled by judicial construction, the construction becomes ... as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a change of decision is to
all intents and purposes the same in its effect... as an amendment of the law by means of a legislative enactment." Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 US. 677, 687 (1879); see also C. Paul Rogers,
III, Judicial Reinterpretation of Statutes: The Example of Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 14 Hous.
L. REv. 611, 626-29 (1977).
110. See Rogers, supra note 109, at 626. The statutory amendment argument is illustrated by
the following excerpt by Justice Black:
When this Court is interpreting a statute, however, an additional factor must be weighed
in the balance. It is the deference that this Court owes to the primary responsibility of the
legislature in the making of laws.... When the law has been settled by an earlier case then
any subsequent "reinterpretation" of the statute is gratuitous and neither more nor less than
an amendment: it is no different in effect from a judicial alteration of language that Congress
itself placed in the statute.
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 257-58 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1970).
111. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972).
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raises the presumption that Congress approves of the judicial
2
interpretation."1
The conditions that support the heightened presumption in the statutory context are weakened in the context of constitutional case law."'
Constitutional precedent, therefore, is subject to a weak presumption of
correctness. That is, in the constitutional context, stare decisis is at it
weakest. Unlike in the statutory context, the judiciary, not the legislature,
is the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution. Since there is no other direct
means by which to correct wrongly decided cases, and in order to allow
for the adoption of necessary changes in the law, the "[judiciary] must
not be constrained by precedent." 114 Otherwise, "incorrect doctrine could
never be changed."" 5 Similar to the legislative acquiescence argument,
the argument in favor of a weak version of stare decisis in constitutional
cases is motivated by the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature.1' 6 Unlike the legislative acquiescence argument, it is the legislature's inability to readily amend a constitution, instead of its silence, that
17
requires the judiciary to adopt a different form of the use of precedent."
IV.

CAN CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT BE CONCEPTUALIZED AS AN
ESCALATION PROBLEM?

A.

Overview

Having considered the concept of escalation of commitment and the
doctrine of stare decisis, it is appropriate to question whether case law
development, with its central reliance on precedent, can be conceptualized as a sunk costs problem. My contention is that even if we are to
agree that there are strong reasons for supporting the doctrine of stare
decisis, the use of precedent still presents a sunk costs problem. The
manner in which case law develops under our judicial system fits the escalation of commitment prototype. In particular, reliance on stare decisis
112. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1940).
113. It could be argued that since there are mechanisms to amend the Constitution, the failure
of the community to challenge the court's interpretation is similar to congressional silence and thus
signifies acquiescence. The more difficult process of amending the Constitution as compared to enacting new legislation weakens the strength of that argument. See Rehnquist, supra note 85, at 35051.
114. Id. at 350.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 369-70.
117. See id.
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makes it very likely that courts will, in considering the case at hand, tend
to overemphasize the weight and value to be given to precedent.
B.

Case Law Development as Sequential Decision-Making

The sunk costs problem occurs in situations involving sequential decisions. 1 8 Thus, to argue that case law development and adherence to
precedent involves sunk costs, the sequential decision-making characteristics of case law development must first be established.
1.

The Initial Decision

Sequential decisions begin with an individual making a decision in
the hope of achieving certain goals. 119 In the context of case law development, it makes sense to consider the initial case interpreting a statute,
construing a constitutional provision, or deciding a common law dispute
as the starting point. The initial decision then becomes a sunk cost and,
therefore, should not be a factor in future decisions. Thus, to conceptualize case law development as a sunk costs problem, we must identify the
costs associated with judicial decision-making and what aspects of it
amount to a sunk cost.
Judicial decisions are, in a very real sense, costly. There are various
costs associated with reaching a judicial decision. 120 Direct costs include
those associated with reaching a decision as, for example, the effort and
resources that a court must devote to consider and research a case. 12' In
addition, opportunity costs are involved since other cases not yet before a
court either are not considered at all (in situations in which the court has
discretion over the cases it hears) or are forced to await consideration
due to the longer queue that is created. 122
In escalation situations the initial decision is undertaken with a goal
in mind. In the context of judicial decision-making, it is not difficult to
think of possible goals that judges seek to achieve when reaching deci118. See supra Part II.A.
119. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
120. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STruD. 257, 258-71 (1974) (describing the costs associated with the creation of rules); Ronald
A. Heiner, Imperfect Decision and the Law: On the Evolution of Legal Precedent and Rules, 15 J.
LEGAL STUD. 227, 232-34 (1986) (analyzing the evolution of stare decisis as a dominant mode of decision in the common law); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. L. & ECON. 249, 250-51 (1976) (analyzing legal precedent as inputs into the production of judge-made rules of law).
121. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 120, at 267.
122. See Landes & Posner, supra note 120, at 268-70.
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sions. A recent yet voluminous body of literature addresses the question
of the goals judges pursue in their role as decision-makers.'21
Various positions have been identified in this literature. The traditional position states that a judge's goal is to follow the law. 124 Under
this view, judges discern the law governing a particular dispute and then
decide the case in a manner consistent with the basic rule.las A second
position argues that judges seek to maximize prestige. 126 Finally, the
"public choice" model advances yet another view. The general impact of
this literature is that "judges are primarily motivated by a desire to impose their normative views, beliefs, and mores on the society in which
they live." 127
For the objectives of this Article it is not necessary to resolve the issue of which of these views is the proper one. The point is that regardless of the particular goal judges have in mind when deciding a case,
their behavior is always purposive. Judges decide cases with some purpose in mind and, once a decision is made, that purpose serves as a
benchmark by which to evaluate the degree of success of their decision.
In the context of case law development, the specific contours of the
judges' goals are dependent on the type of dispute-statutory, constitutional, or common law-the judge is asked to decide. Regardless of the
individual judge's goal, the type of case before the court can impose additional burdens on the judge's ability to achieve his or her goal. For example, in cases in which the court's role is to interpret a legislative act,
the initial goal is, to some extent, established not by the court but by
constraints imposed by the legislature. 28 Thus, the court, under this view,
will try'to discern and give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting
123. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, "High Court Wrongly Elected": A Public Choice Model of
Judging and Its Implicationsfor the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1305, 1310-11 (1997) (analyzing the effect of judicial selection mechanisms on the behavior of judges) and references cited
therein.
124. See Douglas, supra note 72, at 735 (discussing the role of stare decisis in constitutional
cases).

125. See id.
126. See Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107,
129 (1983).
127. Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward A Game TheoreticAnalysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SuroN HALL L. Ray. 736, 738 (1993). As Professor Hasen notes, however,
this view has been challenged in several respects. See Hasen, supra note 123, at 1310.
128. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984); Harold J. Krent, The Failed Promise of Regulatory Variables, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1117,
1118-19 (1995) (discussing the Chevron decision and its implications for statutory interpretation); see
also McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation,
57 LAW & CoNrEMP. PROBS., Wimter 1994, at 3.
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the statute. 29 In common law and constitutional cases, judges are potentially less constrained in terms of the range of options available since the
legislature's intent is no longer a determinative factor. 30
2.

Feedback Phase

Sequential decisions involve a feedback period in which decisionmakers receive information concerning the extent to which their initial
goal has been achieved.' 3' During this phase, the decision-maker may receive feedback indicating that the initial goal has or has not been obtained. If the feedback indicates that the goal has been achieved, then
there is no sunk costs problem since no further decision need be made.
On the other hand, the decision-maker may receive feedback indicating
that the initial decision has produced negative results or that the desired
outcome has not been achieved. For example, consider a car owner who
must decide whether to put additional money into fixing a broken car.
This person's goal is obviously to have a car that works properly. Feedback comes in the form of information concerning the mechanical condition of the car.
After making an initial decision, judges are in the position to receive
feedback about that decision. Whether the feedback is considered negative or positive clearly depends on the goal the judge is pursuing. Judges
who adhere to the traditional position and seek exclusively to find the
law and follow it will evaluate the dispute from the perspective of that
goal. Judges who seek to impose their own views on society will make a
similar assessment. In either case, an opportunity to obtain feedback exists after the initial decision, and that supports the sequential character of
the judicial decision-making process.
In this particular process, feedback may result from a number of unintended sources. Litigants may not intend to provide feedback to the
court as to a prior decision, but they are, nonetheless, creating a situation
for the deciding court to obtain feedback. In addition to the litigants,
other potential sources of feedback exist. Two possible sources are discussed below: the legislature and the judiciary. The degree to which these
sources are relevant depends on the type of dispute (i.e., statutory, constitutional, or common law) with which the court is dealing. Regardless of
129. See generally Edward P. Schwartz et al., A Positive Theory of Legislative Intent, 57 LAW
& CorrrIP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 51.
130. See Rehnquist, supra note 85, at 347-53.
131. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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the context, however, all of the following are potential sources of negative feedback.
a. The Legislature as a Source of Feedback
Legislatures and courts are distinct yet related parts of our system of
law. 132 The extent to which courts should interact with legislatures, the
role that legislatures should play in case law development, and the deference that courts should give to the legislatures are subjects of considerable debate. 133 Two approaches have been advanced as delineating the
basic parameters of this debate.
Under the "static" view, elements of government are believed to act
in isolation from one another. 34 Accordingly, the static view tends to
segregate the worlds of common law and statutory law.135 This approach
holds that courts should pay little attention to-even disregard-legislative interventions into common law since common law is an area of judicial responsibility. 3 6 By the same token, in areas where the legislature
has taken statutory action and decided public policy, the only role left for
the courts to play is that of enforcing the intent of the legislature. 137 The
direction of public policy will, under this approach, only change when
the legislature chooses to act again.'3 8 Under the static model, courts are
limited in their ability to develop case law concerning statutory interpretation. In particular, the court's main task when confronted with interpret39
ing statutes is to discern the meaning of the statute when enacted.
While the static view permits consultation of not only the statute's text
but also a variety of legislative materials, it strictly limits the relevant
time period to that of the statute's enactment. t4°
The "dynamic" approach allows for a much more active relationship between the legislature and the judiciary.141 The dynamic view proposes that common law and statutory law are parts of the legal land132. See Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994
Sup. CT. Rnv. 429, 437 (1994) (describing the relationship between courts and legislatures).
133. See, e.g., GuiDo CM.AABRsi, A COMiMON LAW FOR TE AGE OF STATUrS (1982); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,87 MICH. L. Ray. 20 (1988); Robert Weisberg,
The Calabresian JudicialArtist. Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1983).
134. See Strauss, supra note 132, at 437.
135. See id. at 437-38.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 439-40; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 133, at 47-54.
140. See Strauss, supra note 132, at 440.
141. See id. at 437.
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scape. 142 Legislatures act on the understanding that courts will "flesh
out" statutes. 143 Therefore, courts should recognize this interaction and be
willing to enter the public policy debate with an interpretative approach
different from that suggested by the "static" model. In particular, courts
should recognize that statutes acquire meaning over time as social and legal contexts change. 144 Under the dynamic approach, courts are free to
consult not only the statute's text and its legislative history, but any material that allows the court to arrive at the outcome that best fits contemporary law. 45 The dynamic approach envisions a significant role in the
process of case law development for both the enacting legislature and for
146
future legislatures.
Legislative feedback could take a number of forms. A legislature
may attempt to overturn a judicial decision by means of a legislative
act. 47 If the court's goal was to discern and implement the legislature's
intent, and the legislature feels that the court deviated from the statute's
design, the legislature can intervene or enact legislation to correct what it
perceives to be a wrongheaded course of action. 4 8 Additionally, developments in other areas of the law can serve as feedback to the courts with
regard to different yet related areas. 149 Such developments may reveal
substantive inconsistencies that should be attended to by the courts. 50
Similarly, legislative developments can uncover more favorable ap51
proaches to public policy.
Thus, to the extent that courts operate under some version of the dynamic model, the possibility of the legislature serving as a form of feedback becomes workable. The relevance of the legislature as a form of
feedback will be reduced to the extent that courts adhere to the static
model. Still, the legislature could serve as a source of feedback within
the escalation of commitment context.
142. See CALABRESI, supra note 133, at 81-90.
143. See id. at 91-109.
144. See id.
145. See Strauss, supra note 132, at 440.
146. See id.
147. See Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override: CongressionalReversals of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT'L Rnv. L. & ECON. 503 (1996) (discussing a rational choice
model of congressional reversals).
148. See id. at 503-04.
149. See Strauss, supra note 132, at 439 (pointing to economic regulation at the federal level
over the last two decades as an example of this situation).
150. See, e.g., Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 708-11 (1995), superseded by 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. I 1996).
151. See CALABtasi, supra note 133, at 90-109.
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b. Other Courts as a Source of Feedback
A court also receives feedback by considering the impact of its
decision on other courts. For example, lower courts or appropriate agencies must apply the rulings of higher courts within their jurisdiction to
similar factual situations. 15 2 The higher court can assess the continuing
development of the case law by analyzing how lower courts or agencies
are dealing with the issue. 153 Through this process, a dialogue is established across the levels of the judicial hierarchy to ascertain the effect of
prior rulings.1 54
Lower courts have various ways of communicating with higher
courts. Lower courts, for example, can "underrule" superior court precedents.1 55 Underruling refers to the practice of lower courts disregarding
the precedent of a higher court. 56 While commentators disagree about the
propriety of underruling as a judicial strategy, the general consensus
holds that there are cases in which underruling may be desirable.157 For
example, cases in which the lower court judge possesses a better understanding of the implications of a ruling than members of a higher
court,5' or where the lower court concludes that a given procedural ruling is unmanageable in practice, 159 have been cited as examples of proper
cases for underruling. In addition, lower courts can issue a "critical concurrence." 16 By so doing, a lower court can stimulate legal reform while
following precedent by criticizing but maintaining that precedent and urg152. See generally Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 817 (1994) (discussing the practice of hierarchical precedent).
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Underruling has been supported as necessary to spur legal reform. See Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7
JL.& RELIGION 33, 82-83 (1989) (arguing that underruling may be an essential part of the process
of judicial self-correction). It is not clear, however, that underruling will necessarily lead to reform
since the higher court always has the option of reversing the defiant lower court, resulting in the
same ruling but with a corresponding loss in reputation. See Caminker, supra note 152, at 863-65.
156. See Paulsen, supra note 155, at 82-83. For a recent example of underruling, see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
157. See Caminker, supra note 152, at 862.
158. Professor Caminker argues that underruling would be proper in cases in which the inferior court judge is confident that the higher court judge has failed to appreciate a significant negative
consequence of its precedent. "For example, the Supreme Court might have interpreted an environmental statute without foreseeing the negative effect its interpretation would have on a particular region of the country. A lower court in that region, in contrast, could easily foretell that result." Id. at
862 n.197.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 863.
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ing its reversal. 161
Whether either of these two practices are used, courts and agencies
serve as a valuable source of feedback to other courts. Courts deciding
whether to follow precedent have this information available to them and
ca. use it to improve their decision-making process.
3.

Uncertainty

Under the typical escalation scenario, decision-makers operate under
a degree of uncertainty. Uncertainty here refers to whether committing
further resources (i.e., to continue the same course of action) is likely to
produce the desired result. 62 In the case development process, uncertainty
is likely to permeate decision-making. Judges normally make decisions in
a state characterized by incomplete information about the implications of
their decisions. 163 Thus, it is easy to see how this aspect of escalation can
be identified in case law development.
4. Real Choice
Finally, decision-makers must have a "real choice" in deciding
64
whether to continue or withdraw from their previous course of action.'
Again, it is easy to see the applicability of this factor to the case development context. Except for their duty to rely on precedent, little else
binds judges to follow previous decisions. 65 Judges possess substantial
flexibility in deciding whether to continue or change directions in the development of a legal doctrine. 66 In fact, as discussed earlier, the doctrine
of stare decisis has been applied with different force in different contexts. 67 This suggests that courts have some flexibility in deciding
whether to follow precedent. 68 While there may be other constraints im161. See iL
162. See Brockner, supra note 3, at 40.
163. See Heiner, supra note 120, at 242-46.
164. See Brockner, supra note 3, at 40.
165. Obviously, precedent in this sense cannot be a justification for not changing course since
the doctrine of precedent only dictates that precedent should be followed, not why it should be
followed.
166. The degree of flexibility is greater for judges sitting on higher courts than judges sitting
on lower courts. Still, as discussed earlier, even lower court judges have some degree of flexibility
in the development of legal doctrine.
167. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
168. Various commentators have noted that courts have been inconsistent in the application of
stare decisis, suggesting that the doctrine can be manipulated by the interests of the deciding judge.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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posed on judges limiting their ability to have a real choice,169 in general,
a high degree of flexibility is inherent in the judicial process. United
States Supreme Court Justices, for example, have few internal constraints
on their ability to change directions in the development of legal
1 70
doctrines.
C. Case Law Development as an Escalation Problem
Assuming that the prior discussion is correct and that case law development can be characterized as a sequential decision-making process,
an interesting question is raised: are decision-makers in the judicial process subject to the sunk costs problem? Likewise, are the factors that affect the tendency of decision-makers to consider sunk costs operating in
the context of case law development?, To the extent that some or all of
these factors can be hypothesized to influence the behavior of judges, the
proposition that case law development is indeed an example of escalation
is bolstered.
1. The Substance of the Dispute
Escalation situations are associated with substantive aspects of the
relevant choice itself. 71 In the case law development context, these substantive aspects include consideration of possible doctrinal frameworks,
public policy considerations, and underlying factual assumptions. The escalation framework suggests that, to the extent that information about
these substantive aspects is available and indisputable, judges are less
likely to place inordinate weight on precedent and will, instead, recon72
sider the issue anew.
Not surprisingly, some would likely argue that there is a relationship
between precedent and substance which helps to explain judicial decisions. The escalation framework, however, provides a different kind of
insight. The use of precedent instead of substance as the basis for a decision has been traditionally explained on efficiency grounds. 173 That is, by
169. For example, lower courts might be restricted to follow a given doctrinal bent not because of precedent, but due to the hierarchical nature of the judicial system.
170. Of course, there are other constraints imposed in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Rafael
Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 IL. ECON. & ORG. 263, 266-74 (1990) (discussing the constraints imposed on the Court from a public choice perspective).
171. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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relying on precedent, the court avoids having to delve into the substantive aspects of the case, thereby making the judicial decision-making process more efficient. The escalation framework suggests that the causal direction could go the other way. Under this model, efficiency appears to
be used as a "smoke-screen." Generally, when processing information
necessary to reach a decision, a decision-maker confronting inadequate
data chooses to rely on sunk costs as the source of information. 174 Courts
appear to act in a similar manner by relying on precedent when information as to the substantive aspects of a dispute is unavailable, unclear, or
useless.
Another characteristic of a decision that relates to the tendency of
individuals to escalate is the distinction between "passive" and "active"
decisions.175 In passive situations, commitment to a previously chosen
course of action will continue unless the individual deliberately decides
to change courses. 176 In the case of active decisions, continuing involvement requires the affirmative commitment of resources.1 77 Escalation of
commitment is expected to be more common in cases involving passive
178
as opposed to active decisions.
The passive/active distinction in escalation research is useful in understanding the difference between constitutional and statutory stare decisis and, in that sense, helps us to analyze the process of case development as an escalation of commitment problem. Courts have traditionally
applied stare decisis with more force in statutory cases as compared to
constitutional cases. 79 The basic rationale for the distinction is that in
statutory cases the role of courts is to interpret the intent of the legislature.180 Once a court has reached a conclusion regarding the legislature's
intent, the court's job has been completed. Thereafter, any further
changes in the law should be initiated by the legislature, not by the
courts. In constitutional interpretation, the courts play a more central role
and, thus, adherence to precedent is subject to a weaker presumption.' 81
The escalation framework suggests a curious explanation for the distinction between statutory and constitutional use of precedent. The passive/active distinction in escalation research has been identified in terms
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra note 30 and accompanying text.
supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
supra note 33 and accompanying text.
supra note 34 and accompanying text.
supra note 35 and accompanying text.
supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
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of the actions that the decision-maker must take to escalate. 8 2 For example, in the "counter game," the active condition requires the decisionmaker to take an affirmative action to continue to play, while in the passive condition playing automatically continues.' 8 3 Although researchers
employing the game relate its nature to their experimental subjects, the
subjects do not choose which game to play. 184 In this sense, the substantive aspects of the decision are isolated from other factors affecting the
decision-maker. In the context of judicial decision-making, the divide between statutory and constitutional stare decisis suggests that courts are
"choosing the rules of the game," and that they have chosen to play a
passive role in statutory cases but an active one in constitutional disputes.
By viewing its role more passively in statutory cases, courts are defining
these decisions as passive. Accordingly, courts are more likely to rely on
precedent, as opposed to reevaluating decisions in subsequent cases.
2.

Institutional Reputation and Certainty

The tendency to consider sunk costs is also related to the need to
justify one's actions to self or to others, the tendency of individuals to
treat the prospect of losses differently than the possibility of gains, and
the propensity to treat certain outcomes differently than probable outcomes. 85 All three of these factors appear to be part of the case law development process, manifesting themselves in self-justification and an information processing bias.
Self-justification refers to the tendency of individuals to escalate
their commitment to prior courses of action because of their unwillingness to admit to themselves or to others that earlier decisions were misguided. 186 In the context of the application of stare decisis, there is a notably interesting parallel situation. One of the traditional arguments for
following precedent is the institutional reputation argument, which holds
that the reputation of the judiciary will be adversely affected if the public
thinks that decisions are made in unprincipled manners. 87 Concerns
about reputation are, in a sense, a matter of self-justification. Consistent
with the escalation framework, courts that focus their attention on the is182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 36-37
supra note 35.
id.
supra notes 38-55
supra note 38 and
supra notes 92-96

and accompanying text.

and accompanying text.
accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
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sue of reputation are more likely to rely on precedent. 8 '
Notice the lack of a perfect correspondence between the reputation
effect in escalation situations and the reputation effect of stare decisis.
Stare decisis protects institutional reputation while, in the business context, escalation relates to the protection of individual reputation. Moreover, in the business context, escalating situations are normally associated
with the need for individuals to justify to themselves or others the correctness of their actions. 18 9 In this context, the reputation of the institution is normally not a concern. In the judicial decision-making context,
however, institutional concerns are likely to be of great significance. Depending on the particular court and on the manner of appointment to that
court, judges may have little concern about their individual reputation,
but much more concern about the reputation of the institution.19° It is not
only concern over individual reputation that fuels the sunk costs problem,
but also concerns about institutional reputation.' 9' Applying the escalation
framework to the judicial decision-making context suggests a point for
further development of the escalation literature.
A second type of psychological factor that appears to be relevant in
the application of the escalation framework to the case law development
process relates to information processing bias. As discussed earlier, decision-makers tend to be risk-seeking in the domain of losses and to excessively discount probable, as opposed to certain, outcomes. 92 What this
means is that there is a tendency for decision-makers to continue a failing course of action as long as there is any probability, however small,
that the desired outcome will be attained.
While it is difficult to isolate this type of tendency in the process of
case law development, the comments of judges that have discussed the
doctrine of stare decisis illustrate that this phenomenon is at work. Justice Brandeis, for example, admitted that "[s]tare decisis is usually the
wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."' 93 Judges that
188. As discussed below, infra note 324 and accompanying text, the recent Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992), provides an example of a discussion concerning the issue of institutional reputation and how it affected the Court's decision-making
process.
189. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
190. Elected judges, for instance, might be more concerned about individual reputation than
judges appointed for life. See Hasen, supra note 123, at 1309-13.
191. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
193. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
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follow this reasoning may fall into something akin to the "gambler's fallacy," under which individuals erroneously believe that a series of losses
makes the prospect of a win more likely.1 94 That is, by deciding one
more case in a manner consistent with precedent, the whole doctrine will
be clarified without having to undertake major doctrinal revisions.
Probably the most revealing parallel between stare decisis and the
information processing bias that causes individuals to consider sunk costs
is the status-quo effect. Deciding to reject precedent is like a decision to
change courses in the typical escalation situation. Accordingly, the judicial decision-maker must realize that the prior decision was incorrect, or
at least inapplicable to the present dispute, and reverse course. The decision-maker is likely to see rejecting precedent as a loss given the value
that the system places on stare decisis. 95 As in the typical escalation situation, losses are likely to be "overweighted";196 thus, judges considering
whether to follow precedent are likely to place an inordinate amount of
weight on the value of staying on course. Such a manner of processing
information is likely to fuel the escalation problem.
3. Legitimacy Through Consistency
The need to maintain credibility by showing persistence and consistency has been identified as one of the factors associated with a tendency
to escalate. 197 These factors may operate at both individual and institutional levels within the judicial system, making it more likely that courts
will escalate. At the institutional level, the concern over institutional reputation appears to relate to the question of credibility and consistency.
One of the justifications of stare decisis is the level of legitimacy that it
provides the courts as decision-makers.198 The desire to achieve that legitimacy can be explained, in part, by the concerns of judges about maintaining credibility. Again, this basic premise of stare decisis is closely related to one of the factors that has been identified with an increased
tendency to escalate.
overruled by Helvering v. Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
194. See Garland et al., supra note 48, at 722.
195. See Rehnquist, supra note 85, at 353-43 (discussing adherence to precedent as a way of
legitimizing the authority of the Supreme Court).
196.
197.
198.

See supra notes 47, 55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
See Lyons, supra note 74, at 512.
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4. Inertia and Identity
Structural forces also appear to influence the tendency to escalate in
the judicial context. Inertia, one of the structural determinants identified
in the escalation literature, 99 appears to operate in the context of case
law development. The more time that has passed since the initial decision
was made, the more likely the initial outcome has become internalized by
the individuals affected.20" Once internalized, any attempts to rectify or to
change the initial decision are likely to require major disruptions
throughout the organization.20 1 The interrelationships created with the
20 2
passage of time produce inertia: a tendency to leave things as they are.
In the case law development context, an "older" precedent can become institutionalized, not only as part of the doctrinal framework in a
given area of the law, but also as part of the political identity of a given
judge or court. Over time, inertia makes it increasingly difficult to abandon such a position.20 3 Therefore, the internal' 4 and external 20 5 forces of
inertia make it increasingly difficult for the court to change directions
and increasingly likely that escalation will occur.
V.

NORMATIvE CONSIDERATIONS

The process of case law development, with stare decisis as its
center, apparently shares some common characteristics with the type of
decisions likely to involve sunk costs. This is evidenced by the fact that
judicial decision-making is sequential in nature, and that the factors associated with the sunk costs problem appear to operate in the case law development context. The following discussion considers the normative implications of this realization.
199. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 301-06 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the effect of a
precedent's age on the application of the doctrine of stare decisis.
204.

See Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress

and Courts, 91 AM. POL Sci. REv. 28 (1997) (discussing the rational choice and attitudinal models
of Supreme Court decision-making). While the attitudinal model holds that judges generally have the
ability to decide disputes based primarily on their sincere ideological attitudes and values, it still recognizes the constraints imposed by both the facts of the disputes and the group dynamics generated
in a multi-member court. See id. at 28-29.
205. See generally Gely & Spiller, supra note 170 (explaining that as a political actor, the judiciary is subject to the constraints imposed by the other branches of government).
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Sauce for the Goose... ?

While traditional law and economics scholars disagree with much of
what behavioral law and economics scholars have to say, they probably
agree on the view that the sunk costs problem is real and that it tends to
result in less than optimal outcomes.2 6 Decision-makers, it is argued, will
be better off by learning to disregard sunk costs in all cases. As will be
discussed later, researchers have identified "de-escalation" strategies to
201
alleviate this decision-making flaw.
Having asserted that judicial decision-making suffers from a sunk
costs problem, the remaining question is: is this bad? Is stare decisis to
be condemned because of its escalation of commitment tendencies or are
there other reasons that justify adherence to precedent despite the existence of a sunk costs problem?
B.

The Saving Grace: Judges' Roles in the Lawmaking Process

As discussed earlier, the doctrine of stare decisis has been justified
under three different theories: efficiency, equality and institutional reputation, and certainty and reliance. 20 8 I have shown that these rationales are
indeed the reasons why the doctrine can be described as an escalation of
commitment problem. Each of the arguments advanced in favor of stare
decisis include factors that decision-making researchers have identified as
producing escalation of commitment situations. If the efficiency, equality,
and certainty/reliance rationales were the doctrine's only support there
would be but one conclusion: get rid of it!
There is, however, a saving grace for stare decisis. A common
theme pervades among the various rationales advanced in favor of the
doctrine of stare decisis. This common theme is, in effect, bigger than
each of its individual components. Stare decisis reinforces one of the
most central values in the American political system: the belief that principles governing society should be "rules of law and not merely the
opinions of a small group of men who temporarily occupy high of° This argument reflects the understanding that judges play a critifice. 2 09
206. For an interesting debate between traditional and behavioral law and economics proponents, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv.
1471 (1998); Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response to
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1577 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1551 (1998).
207. See infra notes 211-19 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
209. Maltz, supra note 74, at 371 (citing Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v.
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cal role in developing the law, a role that is different from any other
function within our political system-and probably different from any
other type of decision-making in general. The public perception of what
the "rule of law" is involves a "blend of the value systems of both past
and present judges, leaving room for both continuity and change. ' 2 °
Under this rule of law view, prior case law is essential to maintaining the
supremacy of law over the opinion of current office holders and, thus,
judges must pay attention to it.
This view suggests that judges are different from other types of decision-makers in a very important way. While other decision-makers
should not include prior decisions (sunk costs) in their calculus, judges
are expected to do exactly that because of their role in developing the
law. Therefore, a judge's tendency to consider sunk costs is not pathologic, but a required component of the job description.
Attention to prior decisions, however, should not be absolute. The
rule of law requires a combination of both present and past considerations and allows for continuity and change. Although judges are different
kinds of decision-makers, they are also subject to the sunk costs problem.
The issue then becomes how to apply stare decisis so as to maximize
both rule of law values and minimize escalation of commitment
problems. The remainder of this Article focuses on that issue.
VI.
A.

A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

De-escalating Commitment

Decision-making researchers have identified two approaches for reducing escalation. 2" Under the reverse-treatment approach, researchers
have sought to manipulate the forces believed to create the tendency to
21 3
escalate. 2 2 Reducing these forces is expected to result in de-escalation.
This approach attempts to reduce those forces believed to increase the
tendency of individuals to justify--either to self or to others-a prior decision.214 For example, researchers have suggested that separating the inFlorida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 154 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
210. Id. at 372.
211. See Itamar Simonson & Barry M. Staw, DeescalationStrategies:A Comparison of Techniques for Reducing Commitment to Losing Courses of Action, 77 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 419, 419

(1992) (developing a model of de-escalation situations).
212.
213.
214.

See id.at 419-20.
See id.
See id
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dividuals who made an initial decision from those responsible for allocation of further project resources should reduce the tendency to escalate
since such a separation reduces the social and psychological forces likely
21 5
to lead to escalation.
A second approach to reducing escalation has focused on improving
the prowess of decision-makers. 216 This approach aims to improve aspects
of the decision-making process itself which, if left unattended, can lead
to escalation. 217 For example, the consideration of sunk costs in future
decisions is linked to the tendency of decision-makers to "continue with
old policies without reevaluating their earlier decisions, thus saving decision time and effort. ' 218 To overcome this tendency, researchers suggest
establishing procedures to force decision-makers to thoroughly evaluate
all options, including comprising a detailed list of the reasons for and
219
against each potential alternative.
Both of these approaches attempt to create a link among sunk costs,
negative feedback, and the subjective probability of future returns. 220 That
is, de-escalation is possible when the uncertainty inherent in future decisions is reduced by relying on the diagnostic value provided by the negative feedback individuals receive. 221 It is critical, then, to take some initiative that helps decision-makers to identify the informational value
encoded in negative feedback so that they may realize when "persistence
'222
is more costly than withdrawal.
B.

Can Case Law be De-escalated?

Having discussed the de-escalation framework, the focus now shifts
to applying the insights acquired from this consideration to the question
posed earlier: what is the proper weight to be given to precedent? Additionally, how can judges fulfill their role under the rule of law while
avoiding excessive escalating-type behavior?
De-escalation research suggests two approaches to reduce the decision-maker's tendency to escalate: (1) manipulation of the factors that
cause individuals to justify (to self or others) prior decisions; and (2) im215. See Staw & Ross, Knowing, supra note 3, at 71-74.
216. See Simonson & Staw, supra note 211, at 420.
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. See id.
220. See Garland et al., supra note 48, at 722.
221. See id. at 726.
222. Il (quoting Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Behavior in EscalationSituations: Antecedents,
Prototypes and Situations, in 9 REs. ORGANZATiONAL BEHAv. 39, 69 (Barry M. Staw ed., 1987)).
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provement of decision-making by making apparent the diagnostic value
of the negative feedback received by the individual making the decision.223 Normally, the escalating effects of the need to justify could be
limited by: separating the initial decision-maker from the individual in
charge of deciding future allocations; 224 providing assurances of confidentiality;225 and reducing the risk of failure by limiting the implications to
226
the individual having made a decision that led to a negative outcome.
In the context of judicial decision-making, however, not much can
be done to reduce the need to justify to self or others. Indeed, several
safeguards are already built into the system to prevent such occurrences.
Natural turnover in the judiciary is likely to result in situations in which
the same court, but not the same judges, is involved in decisions in the
same area. Since legal disputes can last for long periods of time, it is
possible that different decision-makers will be involved in future decisions. Similarly, at the federal level, the fact that judges are appointed
for life minimizes concerns that their decisions will be influenced by po227
tential career implications.
The other approach to reducing the tendency to escalate involves focusing on improving aspects of the decision-making process itself.228 In
particular, the challenge here is to force the decision-maker to recognize
the sunk costs character of the prior decision and to become aware of the
diagnostic value imbedded in the negative feedback received. In this
area, de-escalation theory could exert a positive influence in the development of case law. By characterizing prior decisions as sunk costs, judges
should be able to recognize prior cases for what they are and, thus, be
more willing to consider the arguments for or against a given course of
action without the taint introduced by precedent. Obviously, in making
new decisions, judges should be free to consider the costs associated with
reevaluating all the arguments advanced for and against a given course of
action,229 the costs associated with changing the direction of the law,230
223. See supra notes 216-22 and accompanying text.
224. In commercial lending institutions, for example, the individuals that handle problem loans
are not the same as those that were responsible for initially approving and serving the loan. See Staw
& Ross, Knowing, supra note 3, at 73.
225. See Simonson & Staw, supra note 211, at 420.
226. See Staw & Ross, Knowing, supra note 3, at 73.
227. See Hasen, supra note 123, at 1319-20. On the other hand, life tenure could increase
identity problems, with judges and their views becoming more institutionalized in a given court. This
tendency could result in an increased tendency to escalate.
228. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
229. A common argument in favor of a system of precedent is the cost-saving aspect of such
a system. The argument is that it is efficient to allow courts to be free from the burden of reconsid-
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and the costs associated with the substantive nature of the decision itself.
There is nothing inconsistent about considering these issues as part of a
sound de-escalation strategy. Indeed, de-escalation requires a critical assessment of all of these issues when making a decision.
This second strategy for de-escalation involves educating the decision-maker about the informational value of negative feedback. Deescalation research suggests that even in cases in which the need for justification is strong, and in which withdrawal is likely to be framed as a
loss, making it painfully clear to decision-makers that continuing reliance
on sunk costs has produced-and will likely continue to produce-failure
will generally improve their decision-making abilities. 231 Applying this
suggestion in the case law development context will require judges to engage in explicit and detailed analyses of the impact of their decisions and
the reasons why those outcomes may be considered failures. In particular, it will require that decisions be analyzed not only in their immediate
context, but also in a larger context that captures all of the costs and
complications associated with the decision.
VII.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ESCALATION MODEL OF PRECEDENT

This section identifies some of the major implications of the approach to stare decisis developed earlier. First, the analysis focuses on
the distinction between constitutional and statutory stare decisis. The escalation of commitment framework suggests that such a distinction is unwarranted and that, instead, a weaker form of precedent should be applied to all types of cases. The analysis then shifts to the recent model of
stare decisis developed over the last decade by the Rehnquist Court. The
Rehnquist Court's model of precedent is evaluated against the escalation
framework. Finally, this section considers a model of stare decisis recently advanced by Professor William Eskridge. Both the Rehnquist and
Eskridge models of stare decisis are interesting because they can be interpreted as consistent with the concerns that the escalation of commitment framework raises about the use of precedent. In that sense, both
models provide supporting justification for the propositions advanced in
this Article.
ering similar arguments each time a case is brought before the court because of the savings produced
in terms of administrative resources. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
230. The concerns here relate to the importance that predictability has in both the ability of
society to arrange its affairs without worrying about abrupt changes in the law and in fostering respect for the rule of law. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
231. See Garland et al., supra note 48, at 726.
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A. Legal Implications: Statutory and ConstitutionalPrecedent
As described earlier, courts have developed a three-tiered hierarchy
of stare decisis, giving precedent a different presumption of correctness
depending on the context in which the dispute arises.332 Statutory precedent has been subject to the strongest presumption of correctness, imposing on the deciding court a strict obligation to follow precedent. 233Constitutional precedents, on the other hand, are subject to a weak
presumption of correctness. 234 The presumption given to common law
precedent is somewhere in between2335 Does the escalation analysis support or contradict the current hierarchy? Are there reasons idiosyncratic
to the decision-making process in each of the three contexts that require
us to make these distinctions? The escalation of commitment paradigm
suggests that there is no "internal" reason to distinguish between various
forms of stare decisis.
The distinction between statutory and constitutional stare decisis is
3 6 First, once
based on two premises23
the judiciary has interpreted a statute, that interpretation becomes part of the statute and, thereafter, only
the legislature can alter its meaning.237 The failure to do so suggests that
the legislature has agreed with the judicial interpretation. 238 Second, in
constitutional adjudication no readily accessible body exists to correct
mistakes by the judiciary.2Y9 The judiciary must, therefore, be willing to
revisit its prior decisions without the constraints imposed by stare decisis.
Because the use of precedent in case law development can be characterized as an escalation of commitment problem, 240 the distinction between constitutional and statutory stare decisis loses some-if not all-of
its force. Indeed, one can argue that recognizing case law development as
an escalation of commitment problem provides a rationale for expanding
the constitutional form of stare decisis to both statutory and common law
disputes. This proposition is discussed towards the end of this section.
First, however, I contend that while the escalation of commitment model
is consistent with the current constitutional approach to stare decisis, it
also presents some new challenges.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
supra note 107 and accompanying text.
supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
supra note 109 and accompanying text.
supra note 110 and accompanying text.
supra note 114 and accompanying text.
supra notes 171-205 and accompanying text.
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Challenges to Constitutional Stare Decisis

The rationale of constitutional stare decisis is, in general, consistent
with the concerns raised by the escalation model of precedent. The escalation model proposes that courts considering constitutional disputes
should be willing to evaluate prior decisions in light of changing circumstances and with an eye towards the future marginal benefits and costs of
their decisions. However, the rationale for this conclusion has little to do
with the theory that stare decisis should apply with less force to questions of constitutional law since these are immune from legislative upset.
Rather, the rationale advanced in this Article is based on the internal
characteristics of the judicial decision-making process itself. The fact that
no other decision-maker is available to review a given decision should
not, in itself, be reason to give precedent an inordinate amount of weight.
The current decision-maker should utilize a decision-making process that
is likely to result in optimal decisions. In the context of legal disputes,
courts should adopt a process that frees them from the decision-making
traps of escalation, regardless of whether other political bodies could
come to their rescue.
The escalation model raises yet another challenge to the current justification for the loose application of stare decisis in constitutional cases.
Judge Easterbrook has noted that our Constitution is similar to most statutes in that it is textual; yet it constitutes a text of a different kind.241 A
constitution is overarching in the sense that it affects major aspects of the
workings of the organization governed by it.242 In the case of our national
government, the Constitution establishes structures that affect all political
interactions. 243 Consequently, argues Judge Easterbrook, revising constitutional decisions ought to be harder than revising statutory ones. 244 The
current justification for constitutional stare decisis fails to respond to this
criticism.
The escalation model, however, addresses this issue. The escalation
model advances the argument that it is inappropriate to give inordinate
weight to a prior decision simply because that is the way things were
done in the past. This does not mean that all aspects of the decision
should not be properly considered, including the costs associated with
changing an already established course of action. Consideration of
241.
REV. 422,
242.
243.
244.

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CoRNELL L.
430-31 (1988).
See id.
See id.
See id.
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whether a change in a constitutional ruling will have rippling effects on
other areas of the law does not, in itself, constitute escalation-type behavior. Indeed, sound decision-making so requires this consideration. By
pointing out the features of proper decision-making, the escalation model
responds to the challenge raised by Judge Easterbrook.
2. Revising Statutory Stare Decisis
Based on an application of the escalation model, current adherence
to precedent in statutory disputes is also, as a matter of decision-making,
unwarranted. The strong presumption of correctness applied in statutory
cases is justified by legislative acquiescence. 245 The underlying rationale
is that the legislature should be responsible for correcting judicial misinterpretation of statutes, and that legislative failure to do so indicates
246
agreement with the prior judicial interpretation.
This argument is basically the flip-side of the justification for weak
use of precedent in constitutional cases. Nonetheless, the escalation
model raises the same basic criticism. This presumption is explained by
factors unrelated to the decision-making process itself. The judiciary is
responsible for providing a better decision-making process regardless of
the ability of the legislature to intervene. There is no reason, therefore, to
burden statutory precedent with a stronger presumption of correctness
than any other. While this suggestion might seem an extraordinary departure from current judicial practice, it is similar to approaches advocated
by the Supreme Court and legal scholars.
B. The Supreme Court and Stare Decisis: If We Could Only Take Them
Seriously!
While the development of a unifying approach to the use of precedent has been a topic of discussion for the Supreme Court for many
years, 247 over the last ten years there appears to have been a renewed interest in such an endeavor.2 48 Various Supreme Court Justices have attempted to provide some guidance regarding the proper use of stare decisis in the context of statutory, constitutional, and common law disputes.
Surprisingly, the Court's current interpretation of the doctrine is fairly
245. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
247. See Rehnquist, supra note 85, at 347-48.
248. See Todd E. Freed, Comment, Is Stare Decisis Still the Lighthouse Beacon of Supreme
Court Jurisprudence?:A CriticalAnalysis, 57 OHIO ST. U. 1767, 1781-90 (1996); Padden, supra
note 8, at 1689-90.
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consistent with the criticisms and reform proposals that follow from the
escalation paradigm. Unfortunately, given what has been characterized as
the "spasmodic way" in which the Court has manipulated stare decisis, 249 it is not clear whether the Court is serious about its new approach
and, thus, whether we can expect the Court to remain loyal to it.250
1. Precedent in the Rehnquist Supreme Court: The Basic Model
The most extensive discussion of stare decisis provided by the Court
over the last decade took place in the controversial Planned Parenthood
v. Casey decision.25t In Planned Parenthood, the Court Was confronted
with the issue of the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute imposing
a number of restrictions on women seeking abortions 5 2 As evidenced by
the opening sentence of Justice O'Connor's opinion,253 the Court's goal
was to resolve the doubt and confusion concerning a woman's constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy, which the Court had recognized
some nineteen years earlier in Roe v. Wade.25 4 The Court sought to
achieve this clarification by announcing its unwavering support for the
"central holding" of Roe. 255 Justice O'Connor's justification for the
256
Court's holding relied heavily upon the doctrine of stare decisis.
O'Connor's opinion is relevant in that it provides the basic model of
stare decisis used by the Rehnquist Court.
The opinion begins by pointing out that the obligation to follow precedent is not absolute.257 The opinion notes the outer limits of the doc249. See Freed, supra note 248, at 1778.
250. Various commentators have noted how, over time, the doctrine of stare decisis has been
supported or abandoned as a matter of political expediency. In the 1960s, for example, facing a liberal Court, conservatives attacked the inclination of the Court to overrule precedent. By contrast,
more recently, and now facing a conservative Court, liberals are quick to criticize the court for failing to adhere to precedent. See id. at 1779.
251. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
252. See id. at 844.
253. Id. ("Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.").
254. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
255. See John Wallace, Comment, Stare Decisis and the Rehnquist Court: The Collision of Activism, Passivism and Politics in Casey, 42 BurFFIo L. REv. 187, 188 (1994). According to
O'Connor, the central holding of Roe v. Wade was threefold. First, "a woman has the right to choose
to have an abortion before fetal viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State."
ld Second, "the State has the power to restrict abortions after viability." Id. Finally, "the State has
legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the life of the woman and the life
of the fetus." Id.
256. See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 854.
257. See id. "The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit." Id.
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trine, stating that on the one hand, efficiency and consistency arguments
make precedent indispensable, 258 while on the other hand, precedent
should be abandoned when "a prior judicial ruling . . . come[s] to be
seen so clearly as error that its enforcement [is] for that very reason
doomed." 259 The opinion then describes what factors, or in Justice
O'Connor's words "pragmatic considerations," courts use to decide
when to overrule or reaffirm a prior case. 260 These four considerations
include
whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability.. .; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special
hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation ... ; whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left
the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine ... ; or whether facts
have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule
of significant application or justification. 261

a. Workability
The first consideration in deciding whether to follow precedent is
whether the rule established in a prior case has proven unworkable.
Planned Parenthood appears to define workability in terms of whether
the prior rule required courts to undertake tasks outside their realm of
competence. In finding that Roe had not proven unworkable, O'Connor
noted that although the decision required courts to assess state laws
affecting the exercise of the choice to terminate a pregnancy, such deter'26 2
minations were "within judicial competence.
The opinion also cited approvingly the Supreme Court's decisions in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority2 63 and Sivift & Co.
v. Wickham. 264 Garcia and Swift define workability not only in terms of
judicial competence, but also in terms of the actual effects of the prior
258.

See id.

With Cardozo, we recognize that no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each
issue afresh in every case that raised it ....
Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent
is, by definition, indispensable.
l (citation omitted).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. L at 854-55 (citations omitted).
262. Id at 855.
263. 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruled in part by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994).
264. 382 U.S. 11 (1965).
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ruling. 26 In particular, workability requires an examination of whether
the prior ruling has produced inconsistent results in its application, 266 and
whether the ruling has produced "mischievous consequences" to litigants
2 67
and courts alike.
Finally, workability has also been defined in terms of the relationship between the precedent case and other relevant statutes. In Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union,268 for example, the Court noted that a prior ruling would be found to be unworkable to the extent that it "poses a direct
obstacle to the realization of important objectives embodied in other
laws."

269

b.

Reliance

In deciding whether to adhere to a prior ruling, courts should also
consider the cost of repudiating the rule as "it would fall on those who
have relied reasonably on the rule's continued application." 270 This
second element equates to the theory of reliance advanced as a justification for stare decisis.2 71 In Planned Parenthood, Justice O'Connor provided a useful summary of the relevant considerations in assessing the
reliance factor.
The Court began its discussion of reliance by pointing out that reliance is, to a large extent, context specific. 272 Reliance, according to the
Court, weighs more heavily in the commercial context, i.e., in cases involving property and contract rights, "where advance planning of great
precision is most obviously a necessity. ' 273 In other contexts, such as
cases involving procedural and evidentiary rules, the issue of reliance is
274
of less significance.
265. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47; Swift, 382 U.S. at 116.
266. In Garcia for example, the Supreme Court pointed out that the application of the holding
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruled in Garcia), requiring the
Court to decide whether a particular governmental function was integral or traditional and, thus, immune from particular federal regulation, led to inconsistent results.
267. Swift, 382 U.S. at 116.
268. 491 U.S. 164 (1989), overruled by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1994).
269. Id., at 173.
270. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
271. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
272. See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 855-56.
273. Id. at 856.
274. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244, 275-78 (1994) (noting the distinction between procedural decisions as presumptively
retroactive and substantive decisions as not presumptively retroactive).
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The Court defined reliance broadly by stating that when assessing
reliance, courts should consider more than specific and clearly defined
instances of reliance. O'Connor conceded that since abortion could be
seen as an "unplanned response to the consequence of unplanned activity," a reliance claim appeared to be fairly weak. 275 She argued, however,
that reliance should be defined broadly enough to include both consideration of "specific instances of sexual activity" and the role that Roe has
played in other areas.27 6 In particular, Justice O'Connor pointed out two
key developments. First, for over two decades people had relied on the
availability of abortion to organize intimate relationships and make
choices that defined their views of themselves and society.277 Second, the
opportunity conferred upon women by Roe to control their reproductive
lives had impacted substantially the "ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation." 278 Both of these
factors, concluded Justice O'Connor, should be factored into the reliance
argument since they are evidence of the way individuals have ordered
their thinking and living around the rule established by the Roe
decision.27 9
c. Intervening Developments in the Law
In further developing her view of the role of stare decisis, Justice
O'Connor considered the role played by intervening developments in the
law since the time the prior case was decided. The decision whether to
adhere to precedent will also be affected by the extent to which related
developments in the law have either removed or weakened the
underpinnings of the precedential decision. 280 The court should assess
whether later developments have rendered the prior decision "irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies." 2 8' The focus of the inquiry here is on legal developments related to the precedent case. It is
not clear whether the factor of "intervening development[s] of the law"
encompasses only decisional law of the Supreme Court, or whether it includes decisions by lower courts and actions by the legislature. 2 2 The
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
§ 1981(b)
281.
282.

Planned Parenthood,505 U.S. at 856.
Il
See id
Id.
See id.
See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989), overnded by 42 U.S.C.
(1994).
Id
Id. An interesting debate has developed with respect to which "intervening develop-
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Supreme Court originally defined intervening developments only in terms
of its own decisions. 283 However, in a 1995 decision, Hubbard v. United
States,284 a plurality of the Court defined intervening developments more
broadly, including not only Supreme Court decisional law but also deci28 5
sions of lower courts as well as actions of Congress.
d.

Changed Facts or Perceptions

Finally, Justice O'Connor stated that the decision to follow precedent will depend in part on "whether facts have so changed, or come to
be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification. ' 28 6 This fourth factor appears to require the decision-maker to evaluate two different aspects of the initial decision. First,
it requires an evaluation of the factual background supporting the prior
ruling. Second, it goes further by permitting the decision-maker to
evaluate not only factual changes but also society's perceptions of those
changes.
With respect to the first element-consideration of changed factsthe decision-maker is asked to inquire about the factual assumptions underlying the prior ruling, and to decide whether changes in the landscape
of potential relevant facts now challenge the central holding of that decision. 287 The second element allows the decision-maker to inquire not only
about factual changes but also about society's interpretation of those
changes. In a case decided just a couple of years before Planned
Parenthood, the Supreme Court described this element as follows: "It
has sometimes been said that a precedent becomes more vulnerable as it
becomes outdated and after being 'tested by experience, has been found
to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare."' 288
ments" can be properly considered under this third factor. Can the Supreme Court justify the abandonment of precedent on a body of law developed by lower courts, or are "intervening developments" limited to the Court's own prior jurisprudence? See Freed, supra note 248, at 1782-90.
283. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989);
Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 321-22 (1972).
284. 514 U.S. 695 (1995), superseded by 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. II 1996).
285. See id. at 711-15.
286. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
287. In Planned Parenthood, for example, while admitting that technological changes in maternal and neonatal health care have changed since the Roe decision, Justice O'Connor concluded
that those changes did not affect the central ruling in Roe, "that viability marks the earliest point at
which the State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions." Id. at 860.
288. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 174 (1989) (quoting CARDozo, supra
note 89, at 150), overruled by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1994).
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In short, in deciding whether to follow precedent, courts should consider the factual context in which the prior ruling arose and evaluate
whether the circumstances have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to justify a refusal to follow the prior ruling.
2. Modifications to the Basic Model of Precedent Used by the Rehnquist Court
The model discussed above provides the basic framework currently
used by the Supreme Court in evaluating the doctrine of stare decisis.
This basic model, however, has been subject to a number of variations.
The four major modifications relate to the type of case, the margin of
victory, the age of the prior ruling, and the "correctness" of the prior
decision.
a. Type of Case
One theme on which there has been-and continues to be-total
unanimity among Supreme Court Justices is the distinction between constitutional and statutory precedent. As discussed earlier, a stronger presumption of correctness is attached to precedent in statutory cases as
opposed to constitutional cases. 8 9 Both empirical and anecdotal evidence
suggests that the Court is more likely to overrule constitutional as com290
pared to statutory precedent.
b. Margin of Victory
In several recent decisions, various members of the Court have modified the basic stare decisis model by adding an additional factor to those
described above. In particular, attention has been focused on the distribution of votes in the precedent case; that is, the margin of victory. For example, in Payne v. Tennessee,291 the Court was confronted with the issue
of whether to permit victim-impact evidence in capital punishment cases.
In evaluating the constitutionality of this practice, the Court had to consider whether to follow two decisions the Court itself had issued within
the last four years. 292 The Court had previously found the introduction of
289. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
290. See Gerhardt, supra note 73, at 87-90; Padden, supra note 8, at 1715 (noting that of 84
cases overruled by the Supreme Court overruling precedent between 1970 and 1993, 63 or roughly
75% involved constitutional questions).
291. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
292. See id. at 811.
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such evidence to be a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.293
In deciding to overrule these two decisions, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that stare decisis is not an "inexorable command," 294 but rather a
"principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the
latest decision. '295 After stating that the rule requiring adherence to precedent was less strict in constitutional cases, 29 6 the Chief Justice concluded that since the two recent opposing decisions had been decided
"by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic
underpinnings of those decisions," they were not entitled to a strong
298
precedential effect. 297 The majority then reversed the earlier decisions.
This new element-the margin of victory in the prior ruling-has been
alluded to in other recent cases 299 and appears to have the support of at
t
least two other Justices: Scalia and Thomas.0
c. Age of the PriorDecision
A third modification of the basic stare decisis model regards the age
of the prior ruling. As described earlier, a traditional argument made in
favor of following precedent focuses on the reliance effect of prior
rulings. 30 ' Under this view, individuals plan their affairs in reliance upon
a certain amount of stability in the rule of law.30 2 The reliance argument
appears to rest on a temporal element. Prior rulings that have endured the
passage of time are likely to have spawned a larger degree of reliance
than recent cases and, thus, are arguably subject to a stronger form of
30 3
stare decisis.
Justice Scalia has advanced this rationale in a number of recent
293. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (finding that the Eighth Amendment
bars the admission of victim impact evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial), overruled
by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (same finding), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
294. Payne, 501 U.S. at 828.
295. Id (citing Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
296. See id.
297. Id. at 829.
298. See id.
299. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1127 (1996).
300. See Padden, supra note 8, at 1708.
301. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
303. This argument appears to be contrary to the conventional wisdom regarding the age of
precedents. It is conventionally accepted that it should be easier to overrule older cases since they
represent outdated interpretations of the law. See Padden, supra note 8, at 1718 (indicating that, as
an empirical matter, recent decisions are not more frequently overruled).
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opinions, 304 adding yet another element to the basic model of stare decisis developed by the Rehnquist Court. Scalia first developed this theme
in his dissenting opinion in South Carolina v. Gathers.30 5 In arguing that
the court should overrule a 2-year-old prior ruling, Justice Scalia noted:
Indeed, I had thought that the respect accorded prior decisions increases, rather
than decreases, with their antiquity, as the society adjusts itself to their existence,
and the surrounding law becomes premised upon their validity. The freshness of error not only deprives it of the respect to which long-established practice is entitled,
but also counsels that the opportunity of correction be seized at3 once,
before state
6
and federal laws and practices have been adjusted to embody it.

d. The Merits of the PriorDecision
Finally, recent Supreme Court decisions have placed a strong
emphasis on whether the Justice deciding the case believes the prior decision was wrongly decided. 0 7 The Court plainly feels it should not be
constrained by precedent when it believes that a prior ruling was incorrect.308 Obviously, the merit of the relevant precedent case has always
been an element in courts' decision-making processes. 0 9 In fact, commentators that have criticized the practice of adhering strongly to precedent have argued that stare decisis is merely a doctrine of convenience in
that it has little or no influence in preventing a court from doing what it
310
would wish to do otherwise.
In recent cases, however, the merit issue has resurfaced in a different context. In Payne v. Tennessee,311 the Court overruled two prior decisions which found jury consideration of victim-impact statements in capital punishment cases to be unconstitutional.312 In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Marshall challenged the majority's decision, pointing out that in
the past the Court had never departed from precedent without "special
justification. ' 31 3 According to Justice Marshall, special justifications in304. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting),
overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
305.

See id.

306. Id.
307. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 708 (1995); superseded by 18 U.S.C. §
1001 (Supp. II 1996); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 833-35 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
308. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 833-35 (Scalia, J., concurring).
309. See Easterbrook, supra note 241, at 423-24.
310.

See Rehnquist, supra note 85, at 371-75.

311. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
312. See id at 828-30.
313. Id. at 849.

HeinOnline -- 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 139 1998-1999

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:89

clude intervening developments in the law, changed facts or perceptions,
314
and a showing that a particular decision has become unworkable.
Therefore, under Marshall's approach, the decision to follow precedent
must be evaluated in light of the factors included in the basic model of
stare decisis.
In response, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion attacked the proposition that special justification is required to overrule precedent.315 Scalia
argued that when precedent is "wrong," sufficient reason exists for the
Court to overrule it.3 16 Any further requirement, he argued, would not be
fair.3 17 Thus, according to Scalia, once the Court decides that the precedent case was wrongly decided, there is little to stop the Court from
overruling it, even if the other factors included in the basic modelworkability, changed facts or perceptions, and intervening developments
in the law-point in the opposite direction.
3. Evaluating the Supreme Court's Approach to Precedentfrom the
Escalation Framework
How does the basic model of precedent advanced by the Rehnquist
Court fare when evaluated from the escalation of commitment framework? Does the current Supreme Court model account for the escalation
problem? When evaluated against the escalation framework, the current
Supreme Court model of stare decisis does surprisingly well. This model
is generally consistent with the solutions identified in the escalation
framework. While some aspects of the Court's model-particularly two
of the modifications proposed by some of the most conservative members of the Court-are likely to result in increased escalation of commitment, the basic model and two other recent modifications are quite
consistent with a strategy of de-escalation.
a. Evaluating the Basic Model
Of the components of the basic model, three-workability, intervening developments in the law, and changed facts or perceptions 318 -are
consistent with the strategy of improving the decision-making process.
Workability, the factor that requires the court to evaluate whether the
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 833 (Scalia, J., concurring).
id. at 834.
id.
supra notes 262-69, 281-88 and accompanying text.
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precedent in question has become a detriment to coherence and consistency in the law, 319 is consistent with the goal of making the decisionmaker aware of the diagnostic value of the feedback received. By requiring the Court to evaluate its decision on the basis of the manner in
which the prior ruling has been implemented, the workability requirement
incorporates into the Court's calculus what is probably the clearest source
320
of feedback available.
The Court's consideration of intervening developments in the law
and changed facts or perceptions is also consistent with the de-escalation
strategy. The effect of these elements on the decision-making process,
however, is different. Instead of facilitating the recognition of the diagnostic value of the feedback received, these two elements help the decision-maker recognize the need to reevaluate all available options. By recognizing intervening developments in the law, courts must consider
whether subsequent changes in the law, either through judicial doctrine
or legislative intervention, have removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the precedential ruling. 321 Similarly, the existence of
changed facts or perceptions requires courts to consider whether the factual assumptions supporting the prior ruling have changed, 322 or whether
the precedent established is now inconsistent with justice or social welfare. 323 Both of these elements thus require the decision-maker to evaluate the dispute in the present context as opposed to that in which the precedent case was decided. This framework then should help the decisionmaker to understand the prior ruling as a sunk cost since it forces him or
her to recognize that the prior decision was made in a specific context
which should not, just because of its historical pedigree, be determinative
of the current outcome.
While these three elements-workability, intervening developments
in the law, and changed facts or perceptions-are consistent with the deescalation strategy, the reliance element is probably inconsistent with deescalation. As described in Planned Parenthood,this element focuses on
the "cost of a rule's repudiation as it would fall on those who have re319. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 849 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
320. For example, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528,
538-47 (1985), overruled in part by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994), the Court considered at length how
the standard developed in a prior case involving governmental immunity for state and local governments and how it has been applied in later cases.
321. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989), overruled by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(b) (1994).
322. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
323. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 174.
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lied reasonably on the rule's continued application. 324
Evaluating reliance from the de-escalation perspective requires clarifying whether the focus of the reliance element is on the costs associated
with past behavior or on future costs. The traditional argument in favor
of stare decisis has framed reliance in terms of the costs associated with
past behavior. 325 Under this theory, individuals that have relied on a prior
ruling will "lose" if the rule is changed. Framing the issue in this way is
suggestive of the typical decision-making flaw in escalation situations in
which the decision-maker believes that there is too much invested to quit.
If reliance is interpreted in this manner, it indeed appears inconsistent
with a de-escalation strategy.
In Planned Parenthood, however, the majority appeared to develop
a forward-looking, more comprehensive view of reliance. In particular,
Justice O'Connor noted that in Roe v. Wade the Court was concerned not
as much with the way that individuals would rely on Roe's ruling with
respect "to specific instance of sexual activities," but with the effect that
overruling the decision would have on broader patterns of social interaction. 326 Thus, Planned Parenthoodappears to draw a distinction between
individual reliance and societal reliance, noting that there is a heightened
concern with reliance when it occurs at the societal level. Although at
the individual level reliance is reminiscent of the "too much invested to
quit" type of reasoning, societal reliance is consistent with a deescalation strategy. At the societal level, reliance becomes so widespread
that the court is well-advised to consider it. Short of this threshold,
reliance is likely to result in escalating-type behavior.
b. Evaluating the Modifications
The four recent modifications advanced concerning the basic model
of precedent raise an interesting issue: are they consistent with a deescalation strategy? In every instance, each of these modifications-type
of case, margin of victory, and the age and merit of the precedent-was
raised in a case in which a precedent was overruled. 327 This suggests that
these modifications are intended to diminish the weight given to precedent and that they are, therefore, less likely to result in escalation of
commitment. Evaluating these modifications from the escalation of com324. Planned Parenthood,505 U.S. at 855.
325. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
326. See Planned Parenthood,505 U.S. at 173.
327. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct.
1114 (1996); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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mitment framework, however, leads us to a more sophisticated conclusion. While margin of victory and merit are consistent with a strategy of
de-escalation, the other two modifications, type of case and age of precedent, are inconsistent with the goals of de-escalation.
Consider, for instance, the margin of victory factor. Under the view
of Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, prior decisions that were decided by
narrow margins, i.e., 5-4, should be given less precedential value.3 28
While the rationale for this approach has not been explicitly developed
by the Court, it is likely based on the fact that a 5-4 decision is an indication of a divided Court that wrestled with an issue that was substantively difficult and highly contentious. Accordingly, the Court allows for
the opportunity to reevaluate potentially wrongly-decided opinions by
giving less weight to these rulings.
This reasoning is consistent with a major finding from escalation research. As discussed, escalation of commitment is associated with decision-makers' unwillingness to admit failure. 329 Individuals, escalation research suggests, are less likely to admit failure when they are asked to
justify their initial allocation of resources. 330 Furthermore, the need to
justify is related to the extent of controversy surrounding the initial decision. 331 If the initial decision was contentious, involving opposition from
within the organization, the decision-maker will likely feel a greater need
to justify and, thus, will have a greater tendency to escalate.
Consideration of the margin of victory may allow the deciding court
to avoid this decision-making trap. By giving less precedential weight to
5-4 decisions, the Court can avoid any likelihood that the "winners" in a
prior case would block attempts to reevaluate that decision in an effort to
self-justify the initial outcome. Thus, by reducing the opportunity for
self-justification the corresponding tendency to escalate is reduced.332
Similarly, consideration of the precedent's merit appears to be fundamentally consistent with a de-escalation strategy. As developed by Justice Scalia, this approach involves evaluating the substance of a prior ruling. 333 Under this factor, little reason to follow precedent exists if the
328. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 828-29.
329. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 43.
332. Note that the margin of victory factor does not entirely solve the sunk costs problem. For
instance, this factor's focus on 5-4 decisions does not deal with the possibility that unanimous or virtually unanimous decisions (e.g., 9-0) could also result in escalation. A unanimous decision might
produce complacency and a greater tendency to escalate.
333. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 833-34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Court believes that the prior ruling was wrongly-decided. 334 While this element has been criticized for turning the doctrine of stare decisis on its
head, 335 it is consistent with the major goal of de-escalation: to motivate
decision-makers to reevaluate decisions based on their merits.
The other two elements-type of case and age of precedent-present
some problems from the de-escalation view. When considering the type
of case, courts distinguish between constitutional and statutory cases, applying a weaker form of stare decisis to the former.3 36 As discussed,
there is little justification from the perspective of decision-making theory
to justify that distinction.3 37 Whether or not there are other sources available to remedy a wrong course of action, a decision-maker should not
make decisions using flawed approaches.
The age of precedent factor focuses, of course, on the age of the
prior ruling. It proposes that older decisions should be afforded a greater
degree of precedential respect than more recent ones. 338 This distinction
has been justified on reliance grounds. 339 Under this theory, older decisions are more likely to have resulted in a larger degree of reliance and,
thus, courts should be more hesitant to overrule them. 340 To the extent
that this theory rests on reliance, it suffers from the same sunk costs flaw
as the reliance rationale. The age justification appears to suggest that
older cases involve a larger or more costly investment; therefore, older
precedent should not be disturbed. Again, the decision-maker appears to
be saying, "we have too much invested to quit."
In short, two of the factors that various members of the Court have
advanced as proper considerations in evaluating precedent-the margin of
victory and the precedent's merit-are consistent with a strategy of deescalation. The other two factors-the type of case and the precedent's
age-are not. To the extent that all of these factors have been introduced
in cases that have resulted in overruling prior decisions, it would appear
that the two factors consistent with de-escalation have dominated.
334.

See id.

335.

See Padden, supra note 8, at 1708-15.

336.

See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.

337. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 303-06 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
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C. The Evolutive Approach of Professor Eskridge
While my discussion of and proposed solution to the problems that I
believe are inherent in a strict doctrine of stare decisis may seem unconventional, my call for change is hardly unique. As the prior section illustrates, the Supreme Court itself has provided a road map to avoidance of
the escalation problem. Other commentators have provided, albeit in different contexts, similar prescriptions. At least one of those commentators
has proposed a model consistent with my arguments herein.
In an extremely thought-provoking article, Professor Eskridge offers
what he refers to as an "evolutive" approach to statutory precedent in
the context of Supreme Court decision-making34l Under the evolutive approach, the Supreme Court should consider the following three questions
when evaluating whether to follow precedent:
(1) Informed by criticism of the precedent and its reasoning by commentators,
lower court judges, and the Court's own opinions, can the Court now say with confidence that the precedent was wrongly decided? (2) Is the precedent not just
wrong, but also pernicious, detracting from overall national policies (3) Do the policy problems engendered by the rule outweigh the potential unfairness to private
persons and the uncertainty for the other rules based upon the challenged rule,
which will occur if the precedent is overtumed? 342

Eskridge justifies his evolutive approach on the ground that it "focuses
on substance and policy rather than on procedure and form. ' 343 The
evolutive approach, according to Eskridge, is consistent with the Supreme
Court's own practice in the field of admiralty, an area of the law under
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and in which the Court is consistently faced with reconsideration of its own common law precedents. 34
The evolutive approach and its rationale are generally consistent
with the lessons from the escalation model of precedent. In order to
avoid the escalation of commitment problem, decision-makers must, at
times, critically challenge their own initial decision, without giving it any
greater weight than warranted by its merits. The first two questions identified by Professor Eskridge are consistent with this framework. In fact,
Eskridge argues that the Court should consider a broad amount of information when determining whether to stray from precedent. The Court,
according to Eskridge, should be willing to reconsider the validity of a
341.
342.
343.
344.

See Eskridge, supra note 74, at 1386.
Id. at 1388.
Id. at 1393.
See id at 1386.
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precedent not only when it is clear that the Court, in deciding the precedent case, failed to carefully consider all arguments and evidence, but
also when the assumptions of the prior holding have changed over
time. 4 5 Similarly, says Eskridge, when looking at sources outside the
case, the Court should evaluate both legislative developments and devel' '346
opments "in social mores, public policy, and social trends.
The final prong of the evolutive approach focuses the attention of
the Court on evaluating all costs and benefits associated with possible
outcomes, with a view primarily towards finding consistency among a
broader set of policies and goals. As suggested by the escalation framework, a core problem with sequential-type decisions is the tendency of
decision-makers to consider sunk costs, that is, to make decisions based
on the costs of prior expenditures instead of focusing on the comparison
of future marginal quantities. Professor Eskridge avoids this problem by
shifting the focus of the inquiry towards the broader issue of costs and
benefits in decisions which may overrule existing precedent. This approach is further consistent with the goal of avoiding the escalation trap.
VIn.

CONCLUSION

In an interesting article published in 1982 discussing the manner in
which legal rules evolve, Professors Blume and Rubinfeld posed the following question: "Should the legal system follow a stare decisis policy
with legal precedent remaining essentially undisturbed over time and
avoid transition costs, or should precedent change rapidly over time to
keep apace with changing social, economic, and technological conditions?" 347 "Our intuition," they concluded, "is that there is little reason
for the observed time path of legal rules to approximate the optimal time
path .... [W]e see reasons for expecting judges and other relevant parties to behave in a socially suboptimal manner. ' 348 They, however, left
their intuition untested, leaving it to future research to take on this issue.
This call, however, has remained unanswered for over a decade. This Article hopefully begins to bridge this gap.
I have suggested a possible new way of looking at the doctrine of
stare decisis. I argue that the development of case law, with the use of
precedent at its core, resembles in many ways the escalation problem.
The Article describes the process of case law development through the
345.

See id. at 1392.

346. Id.
347.
348.

Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 84, at 406.
l at 418.
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lenses of the escalation of commitment model. This analysis suggests that
the various rationales advanced in support of the doctrine of stare decisis
are similar to the factors that decision-making research has identified as
responsible for the sunk costs problem. I argue that this is evidence that
the judicial decision-making process with stare decisis at its core is likely
to lead to an escalation of commitment situation.
The Article then discusses the normative implications of this conclusion. I argue that despite the existence of sunk costs, stare decisis is an
important component of the judicial decision-making process. However,
having identified the sunk costs problem, the question then becomes what
is the proper role that precedent should play in the case law development
process. The Article concludes by providing a framework to help courts
find the right amount of weight to be given to precedent. By looking at
stare decisis as a decision-making rule, the Article contributes to our understanding of the case law development process and to the advancement
of the application of decision-making theory to legal phenomena.
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